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The poem Olmasin Varsin (Let It Be, Let It Not Be), written in 1947 by future Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, is an important work that advocates Turkish-Greek brotherhood. Ecevit wrote this poem during his years in London, while feeling culturally isolated, to highlight the similarities between Turks and Greeks. After he entered politics, the poem became a source of political criticism. On the other hand, Ecevit—who harbored such cultural sympathy toward the Greeks—could not remain silent in the face of the genocide of Turkish Cypriots, as it was he who ordered the 1974 Peace Operation on Cyprus. Of course, the security-oriented focus on national survival that influenced Türkiye’s stance in negotiations over Cyprus has a history of its own.
The painful memories of the Tripolice Genocide—which the Greeks launched against the Turks in the Peloponnese beginning on Sept. 23, 1821—triggered the Peace Operation in response to Greek attacks. For some reason, that genocide committed by the Greeks against the Turks is still not widely known internationally. As a result of this silence, the Greeks later committed genocide against the Albanians living in Chameria – a region along the Ionian Sea – in 1944. That genocide, too, was buried in silence. It thus appears that the silence following every genocide committed by the Greeks leads to a new genocide. The violence directed against Turks on Cyprus since the 1960s is no different from that in Tripolice and Chameria. It is at this point that the importance of the Cyprus Peace Operation becomes clearer.
The lessons to be learned from these genocides are clear. First and foremost, it is necessary to remain strong in the military sphere, maintain the political initiative, deny the opposing side the opportunity to construct arguments, and pursue a consistent strategy grounded in facts. Of course, the unconditional pro-Greek and pro-Cypriot bias of Europe, the EU, and the US against Türkiye must also be taken into account. For this reason, it is imperative for Türkiye to keep issues in the Aegean and Cyprus at a manageable level.
Efforts to normalize relations and establish a positive agenda to resolve the issues between Türkiye and Greece are still ongoing. However, the “naughty child” attitude of Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Defense Minister Nikos Dendias creates volatility, frequently disrupting the diplomatic process. Greece, caught up in a fervor for rearmament, has now added Israel to the list of American and French military presences in the country. With Israel’s access to the Greek mainland, Cyprus, and the Aegean islands, it is now possible for Israel to take sides like a wind-up toy soldier in tensions that Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration do not want.
Meanwhile, amid concerns stemming from Russia, issues arising from Greece and the Greek Cypriots have caused growing frustration within the EU. It has come to light that the Greece-Greek Cypriot duo—who “host” Russian businesspeople in southern Cyprus and Greece and allow financial transactions with high commissions—are transporting Russian oil via their shadow fleet. For this reason, Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, who have vetoed sanctions against Russia under the EU umbrella, have faced a backlash from other EU member states. Europe, now focused on repairing relations with Türkiye following this month’s NATO summit in Ankara, has launched a new political process to overcome the Greek and Greek Cypriot obstacles. The search for a way out—without sacrificing Greek and Greek Cypriot interests—has begun.
In this context, the artificial issues regarding Cyprus created by the Greece-Greek Cypriot duo have begun to be reignited over the past month. It may be helpful to list these developments and interpret their significance from a different perspective.
In a “naive” assessment of the European Commission’s insistence on the Cyprus issue, the obstacles posed by Greece and the Greek Cypriots to prevent Türkiye’s inclusion in the European defense industry and funding can be highlighted. Indeed, while Europe is scrambling to boost its defense capabilities, the Greece-Greek Cypriot duo has clearly played the veto card. Despite Türkiye submitting the paperwork, the EU did not even respond to Ankara's invitation for talks regarding the SAFE program. Frustration has reached such a point that, at a time when the Russian threat is felt so intensely, the European Commission appears to be seeking a middle ground. However, such a need does not signal the existence of an environment favorable to Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots. As seen in the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the 2004 Annan plan, it cannot be claimed that a compromise guarantees a fair European approach or an honest Greek-Greek Cypriot stance.
EU Commission President von der Leyen met with UN Secretary-General Guterres on July 12. In a statement, she said: “Momentum has been reignited toward resolving the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in line with EU principles, values, and legislation.” This statement essentially serves as a confirmation of Greek and Greek Cypriot rhetoric. The Greeks have always used Europe as a catalyst when it comes to the Turks. Indeed, a look at history reveals that turning points such as Greek independence, the Greek expansionist “Megali idea” vision during World War I, the handover of Cyprus—which had been annexed by the British—to the Greek Cypriots, and the transfer of the Aegean Islands to Greece were all privileges granted to the Greeks by Europeans.
Following von der Leyen’s statement, the European Commission named Raffaele Fitto special representative for Cyprus. It should be kept in mind that Fitto has openly supported Greek interests in the past. Given his position as vice president of the European Commission—a role that grants him the authority to use EU funds not as a tool, but as a weapon—it would be unrealistic to expect him to take a stance against the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, in the matter of Cyprus, the exclusion of the three guarantor countries and the EU’s assumption of ownership of the issue in cooperation with the UN would render the 1960 guarantee treaties ineffective. At this point, it should not be forgotten that the Greek side has always characterized the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus issues as an EU-Türkiye problem. Consequently, von der Leyen’s initiative actually serves the Greek-Greek Cypriot agenda—that is, transforming the Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean issues into an EU-Türkiye matter.
UN Secretary-General Guterres’s upcoming July 27–29 visit to both the south and north of Cyprus is, naturally, significant because it follows consultations with the EU. Guterres is well aware of the Greek Cypriots’ betrayal in the 2004 Annan plan referendum and their hypocrisy at Crans-Montana, Switzerland in 2015-2017. In an environment where mistrust runs so deep, Guterres prefers to operate behind a veil of secrecy and maintain a low profile. The fact that his relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is impartial and maintains an equal distance has actually made Guterres the ideal choice for the EU, Greece, and the Greek Cypriots. He is likely aware of this situation himself. It is quite probable that he wants to bring about a revolutionary development in this matter and leave his mark on history before his term ends.
Despite Guterres’ enigmatic stance, details of UN Special Representative for Cyprus Maria Angela Holguin’s plan got media coverage. According to the Independent, Holguin envisions “a looser structure that departs from the classic federal model.” The aim is to simultaneously address the possibility of a “confederation” by setting aside the Greek Cypriot side’s demand for a federation and the Turkish Cypriot side’s demand for two equal states. Such a draft actually points to an ambiguous structure. According to the report, “the two founding states will continue to exist on the basis of political equality; day-to-day administration will largely be left to the founding states, while the central authority will be limited to common areas such as foreign policy, defense, and EU relations.” Additionally, it is envisaged that “on the security front, the 1960 Guarantee and Alliance Treaties will be replaced by a NATO-centered model and the establishment of a limited multinational force.”
If the report is accurate, the guarantor system is being rendered a mere formality on paper but nonexistent in practice. A federal system is being designed under the guise of a confederation. In other words, a path is being paved for the Greek Cypriots’ demands—to put it politely—through the illusion of EU guarantees and NATO. In such a context, the significance of Erdogan’s visit to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) this week on July 20, the anniversary of the Cyprus Peace Operation, is growing.
Türkiye’s objective in the Cyprus talks seems quite clear. First and foremost, the genocides committed by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots in the past must not be repeated. Even the slightest concession would mean the eradication of Turkish Cypriots from the island. The second issue concerns Türkiye’s security. It is unthinkable that Türkiye would allow any attempt to encircle it. Can the Greece-Greek Cypriot duo—who, in violation of treaties, have militarized the Aegean islands and brought other states into the region—be trusted?
Türkiye is well aware of the intentions of the Greek and Greek Cypriot sides, who approved of the Annan plan at the negotiating table but rejected it in a referendum. For this reason, the process must be skillfully managed, and the Greek-Cypriot mask must be properly exposed. Indeed, the Greece-Greek Cypriot duo emerging under the guise of the European Union to dance the sirtaki dance is not a scene Türkiye would applaud.
* Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.
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