- The author is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations at Ankara University

ISTANBUL

Following the outbreak of war between the US-Israel and Iran on Feb. 28, Tehran began targeting Gulf states. What had been considered the most fundamental measure for enhancing Gulf security -- hosting US military bases -- paradoxically became a source of deeper insecurity. Although Gulf states have consistently maintained that "this is not our war" and "we did not choose this war," the US-Iran conflict exposed how the monarchies' vulnerabilities are exploited as instruments of regional politics.

Put differently, Iran is indirectly undermining Washington by raising the costs for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that operate in close partnership with the US. At the same time, the US is making clear that the geopolitical positioning of the GCC states under its protection is itself the primary driver of their security vulnerabilities -- and that the Gulf cannot achieve stability unless this aggressive posture is abandoned. Iran, meanwhile, has adeptly demonstrated that its own security is intertwined with that of the GCC, underscoring the enduring relevance of "Shia geopolitics" in this calculus.

Beyond the political analysis, mapping the operational sequence of attacks and identifying their targets over this period is of critical importance.

Operational flow and targets of the attacks

Over the past week, the scale of Iran's strikes against Gulf states has reached significantly elevated levels. As an initial observation on the operational flow, Iran conducted more than 2,519 missile and drone strikes against Gulf states within a single seven-day period [1]. For context, roughly 1,500 strikes were carried out during Iran's 12-day war against Israel.

Second, Iran's strike strategy has undergone notable shifts since Feb. 28. Tehran initially relied more heavily on ballistic missiles before gradually scaling back their use and intensifying drone operations.

Third, while Iran's stated primary objective has been to target US military bases on Gulf territory, the strikes have affected civilian infrastructure and energy facilities as well.

In Saudi Arabia, for instance, 40 percent of strikes were directed at Prince Sultan Air Base and its vicinity, 33 percent targeted energy facilities, 10 percent were concentrated on diplomatic zones including Riyadh, and the remaining 16 percent struck other targets [2]. This same operational pattern has been observed across the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Iran's three core target categories can therefore be identified as: US military bases, civilian areas -- encompassing airports and energy infrastructure, with considerable economic implications -- and US embassies.

Fourth, although Gulf states have largely succeeded in repelling successive waves of strikes, the campaign is designed not only to cause military damage but to exert sustained economic pressure. This has significantly undermined the Gulf's long-standing image as a politically stable, conflict-insulated region. The fact that a large proportion of strikes has occurred at night further suggests that operations have been deliberately timed to strain and overwhelm air defense systems.

According to an IISS report, interception rates vary considerably across Gulf states. The UAE reported an overall interception rate of approximately 93 percent against ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [3], and successfully intercepted all eight cruise missiles fired at its territory.

Qatar's overall interception rate stands at 89 percent, with a particularly strong performance against missile strikes at 97 percent. Its interception rate against UAVs, however, is comparatively lower at 72 percent. Qatar also announced the neutralization of two Iranian Su-24 combat aircraft.

Bahrain's performance falls somewhat short of the UAE and Qatar, though its geographic proximity to Iran and exceptionally small land area are worth noting as significant compounding factors. The country nonetheless achieved an overall interception rate of 76 percent -- 86 percent against missiles and 71 percent against UAVs. Reliable interception figures for Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia are unavailable due to insufficient data.

Lasting and high-cost consequences for Gulf security

At this juncture, the mixed signals emanating from all parties, combined with ongoing multi-dimensional strikes, appear set to produce lasting and deeply costly consequences for Gulf security. Following the US strike on a water treatment facility on Iran's Qeshm Island, for instance, similar facilities across Gulf states could well become the next targets [4-5]. A second critical concern is that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and strikes on energy infrastructure have dealt a fundamental blow to the Gulf's most vital foreign policy and economic assets. By selectively targeting certain maritime assets while leaving others untouched, Iran is asserting its dominance over the Strait and generating serious logistical uncertainty. For GCC states whose economic prosperity depends on long-term energy agreements, this constitutes a grave political-economic challenge.

A third concern stems from the contradictory messaging coming out of Tehran, a reflection of Iran's turbulent internal transition. After Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced he would cease attacks and apologize to neighboring states, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned that US bases in the region remained viable targets. The Iranian Parliament then declared that any country hosting US bases would not be spared. These fragmented and mutually contradictory signals risk locking the conflict into an increasingly unmanageable dynamic. Iran appears to be simultaneously pressuring Gulf states to deny the use of their territory against Iran, while hedging its own posture -- whether out of diminished missile capacity or a desire to open diplomatic channels -- yet this recalibration lacks consensus across Iran's fractured domestic political landscape.

In sum, Iran's ambiguous and fragmented political process, the Gulf's sustained exposure to high-cost strikes, and Washington's continued offensive operations without adequate regard for Shia geopolitics may prove to be the defining dynamics fueling both regional escalation and growing economic risk in the period ahead.

[1] https://x.com/ibrahimjalalye/status/2030299135614632345

[2] https://x.com/ibrahimjalalye/status/2030299135614632345

[3] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/data-visualisation/cumulative-confirmed-missile-uav-and-fighter-jet-interceptions-by-the-gcc-states/,

[4] https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/iran-disisleri-bakani-arakciden-abdnin-deniz-suyu-aritma-tesisi-saldirisina-tepki-7538562

[5] https://x.com/hamidrezaaz/status/2030426863143673971

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.