• The Horn of Africa is experiencing one of its most volatile periods since the 1980s, and the influence of external actors, particularly regional ones, has increased significantly. Alongside Israel and France, the growing involvement of Gulf states has further intensified regional power struggles
  
  The author is a researcher and writer on the Horn of Africa

ISTANBUL 

The Horn of Africa has emerged as one of the primary regions where global competition is intensifying, owing to its geostrategic position overlooking the Red Sea basin and the Indian Ocean. In this context, Ethiopia stands as a pivotal actor due to its large population, comparatively robust military capability, and long-standing state tradition. However, in recent years, the country has been grappling with simultaneous geopolitical, economic, political, and humanitarian fragilities. This situation directly affects not only Ethiopia’s internal stability but also the broader balance of power across the Horn of Africa.

Geopolitical dimension: Weakening decision-making capacity

The Horn of Africa is currently confronted with multilayered instability. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has rendered regional balances even more precarious. Although the threat posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia has been partially contained compared to the past, it continues to persist. Meanwhile, in Sudan, one of the bloodiest wars in recent years is ongoing. In Ethiopia, internal conflicts in the Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray regions have further deepened domestic fragility. These developments demonstrate that security and political stability have not yet been permanently secured across the Horn of Africa, and achieving such stability in the near future remains a significant challenge.

Additionally, Ethiopia—arguably the most influential actor in the region—is traversing a period in which its sovereign decision-making capacity appears historically weakened. Since the outbreak of the Tigray War in 2020, the country has been unable to permanently resolve its fundamental economic, social, and military challenges, clearly indicating that existing vulnerabilities persist.

The Horn of Africa is experiencing one of its most volatile periods since the 1980s, and the influence of external actors, particularly regional ones, has increased significantly. Alongside Israel and France, the growing involvement of Gulf states has further intensified regional power struggles.

The Addis Ababa government’s renewed discourse on maritime access, its harsh rhetoric regarding Eritrea, and the memorandum signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland in 2024 have heightened regional tensions. In particular, Somaliland’s recognition by Israel is seen as a development that could undermine Ethiopia’s strategy of “recognition in exchange for sea access.” This signals a new phase in which Ethiopian and Israeli interests do not fully align.

Over the past six months, rising tensions with Sudan have also drawn considerable attention. However, it remains unclear whether this confrontational policy has yielded tangible gains in terms of national interest. Current indicators suggest that foreign policy initiatives are being pursued amidst internal structural fragilities and multilayered security challenges, pushing decision-making processes into an environment of heightened uncertainty and risk.

Economic fragility and external dependency

Economic indicators in Ethiopia reflect a precarious trajectory. Tax and export revenues continue to decline, while export growth relies heavily on the mining sector, revealing a lack of structural diversification. Yet, mining activities, especially when conducted in conflict-affected zones, carry significant security risks.

Although reform measures such as currency devaluation aim to mitigate macroeconomic imbalances in the short term, they risk further eroding public services. Financial support from Gulf countries and China’s debt restructuring efforts have provided Addis Ababa with some breathing space. However, this may also limit the influence of international financial institutions and reduce long-term reform pressure. Consequently, economic fragility acts as a multiplier, exacerbating existing political and humanitarian risks.

Political centralization and shrinking civic space

In domestic politics, the concentration of power is increasingly evident. Growing personalization around the executive branch, frequent Cabinet reshuffles, and the narrowing of the political leadership pool are notable developments. The departure of several prominent Oromo and Amhara figures from the ruling party signals a fragmentation at the elite level. Furthermore, the fact that some opposition figures remain imprisoned while others reside abroad indicates a shrinking political space.

This centralization trend has also weakened local governance capacity. Over the past decade, insufficient financing and increasing political control have led to capacity losses in health, education, agriculture, and humanitarian assistance. At the local level, corruption, administrative inertia, and declining data transparency have eroded the state’s ability to deliver essential services.

Ongoing conflicts and humanitarian crisis

Since the war that many believed had concluded in 2022, internal conflicts in Ethiopia have not fully ceased. In the Amhara region, operations continue against a fragmented but socially rooted insurgency, and the state of emergency has been extended. In Oromia, clashes with the Oromo Liberation Army have entered their fifth year.

Although the November 2022 ceasefire in Tigray has largely held, the return of displaced populations, especially in Western Tigray, has not been secured, and federal–regional tensions persist. The weak 2023 harvest has triggered a serious food crisis in Eastern Tigray, Northern Amhara, and Afar. Agricultural production remains far below pre-war levels, and social safety nets have not returned to their former scale, further worsening the humanitarian outlook.

Significance of President Erdogan’s visit

In this multilayered and fragile environment, Türkiye’s past security and economic support has created a foundation of trust for Addis Ababa. In contrast, Israel’s sudden diplomatic openings in the region, particularly regarding Somaliland, do not fully align with Ethiopia’s strategic calculations.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Ethiopia stood out in public discourse for two main reasons. The first was the comprehensive and high-level reception ceremony held in Addis Ababa. The second was Erdogan’s clear and direct message in his speech; he emphasized that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland would bring neither stability nor benefit to Somaliland or to the Horn of Africa. He also issued a notable warning that the region should not be transformed into a theater of competition and struggle among foreign powers. This message demonstrated that the visit offered not merely a diplomatic engagement but a strategic framework.

The visit of Israel’s President to Addis Ababa can be interpreted as Ethiopia’s attempt to balance its growing risk of geopolitical isolation and expand its maneuvering space by engaging with multiple actors. However, the current landscape suggests that Israel’s capacity to directly resolve Ethiopia’s core unresolved issues remains limited.

Today, Ethiopia faces simultaneous geopolitical tensions, economic fragility, political centralization, institutional capacity erosion, and ongoing internal conflicts. The humanitarian situation in the northern regions has reached critical levels. Under these conditions, Addis Ababa’s foreign policy moves carry heightened risks. Political balances in the Horn of Africa will largely be shaped by whether Ethiopia can reestablish internal stability and translate its relations with external actors into strategic gains.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.