The author is an associate professor of International Relations at Yeditepe University in Istanbul.
ANKARA
The US and Israeli strikes on Iran are reshaping not only regional but global balances of power, putting not only the West-Iran conflict at stake but also the broader trajectory of great power competition. Of all the players whose stance has been most closely watched throughout this process, Russia stands out.
Moscow has criticized the strikes, though with notably measured language that fell short of the strong response many anticipated, while signaling that it is following developments with careful attention. The strategic relationship between Moscow and Tehran has yet to reach the level of a full alliance, but Russia clearly seeks to protect its interests as one of the key actors along the north-south axis of Eurasian geopolitics. Against this backdrop, Russia's effort to cast itself as a diplomatic broker working toward an end to the war carries considerable weight. The most coherent reading of this posture is that Moscow is navigating a balance between strategic partnership and geopolitical opportunism in its approach to Iran.
The Moscow-Tehran axis: The limits of strategic partnership
On Jan. 17, 2025, Russia and Iran signed what stands as their most comprehensive strategic agreement to date, covering military and energy cooperation. Under a 20-year strategic partnership framework, the two countries committed to coordinating across defense, energy, trade, technology, and finance, establishing economic platforms aimed at blunting the impact of US sanctions and aligning on counterterrorism and broader regional cooperation. Though the agreement falls short of a formal military alliance, it has been widely interpreted as a significant step toward institutionalizing military-technical and strategic ties between the two countries.
Under a Dec. 2025 air defense agreement, Russia committed to supplying Iran with its Verba MANPADS system, with delivery of approximately 500 launchers and 2,500 missiles scheduled between 2027 and 2029. Russia is also one of Iran's critical partners in nuclear energy -- the two countries are planning to jointly build eight nuclear reactors and signed a new nuclear deal worth roughly $25 billion in 2025. This expanding web of military, energy, and nuclear cooperation, shaped in large part by shared exposure to Western sanctions, is likely to push Russia toward diplomatic rather than military measures as it seeks to keep Iran viable as a regional partner and out of Washington's orbit. Moscow, in short, cannot afford to lose Iran but is equally unwilling to be drawn into direct confrontation with the West.
Mediation diplomacy
This tension is precisely what has pushed the Kremlin's diplomatic profile to the fore. As the war against Iran got underway, Moscow wasted little time in calling for a political solution. Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that the crisis must be resolved through diplomacy rather than force, and in a subsequent call with US President Donald Trump, he pressed for an urgent political and diplomatic resolution. Behind Moscow's conspicuously measured tone lies a straightforward calculation: runaway instability in the region poses a direct threat to Russia's own interests.
From the very first day of the crisis, Putin also signaled that Russia was prepared to act as a mediator. A Kremlin readout indicated that Putin, in contact with the warring parties, expressed Moscow's readiness to provide "mediation support to encourage dialogue and negotiation." Phone diplomacy with Gulf leaders carried a consistent message, that diplomacy is the only viable path out of the crisis. One statement that drew particular international attention was Russia's characterization of the strikes on Iran as "the use of force in violation of international law" -- a striking position, given that Russia's war on Ukraine is contested on precisely the same legal grounds, even as the Putin administration continues to frame its military operations as legitimate self-defense.
Russia's pragmatic balancing act and the geoeconomic fallout of the Strait of Hormuz crisis
In the current environment, Russia is best understood as an actor that is avoiding direct military confrontation with the West while pursuing a carefully calibrated balancing policy. Moscow is working on two tracks simultaneously: trying to cultivate the image of a global mediator, while positioning itself to convert the crisis into geopolitical and geoeconomic gain. The war's heaviest economic toll will continue to be felt through oil and gas prices. Beyond Iran's conventional military capabilities, its ability to play the ultimate card -- closing the Strait of Hormuz -- has already sent shockwaves through regional and global markets alike, with the reverberations still growing.
The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day -- about 20% of global supply -- and Iran's closure of the strait to Western economies has raised the specter of a crisis more severe than the 1973 OPEC shock. Goldman Sachs has warned that a sustained blockage could push European gas prices to more than double their current levels, reaching $1,230 per thousand cubic meters. That prospect has inevitably drawn attention back to Russia -- one of the world's largest gas suppliers, currently hobbled by sweeping sanctions.
The energy crisis and Russia's resurgent geoeconomic space
The Iran war has handed Russia what might be called a great opportunity and a great risk at the same time. It is worth recalling that the 1973 OPEC crisis was precisely the moment the Soviet Union began its ascent as a global energy supplier. History may now be offering a rerun: whether by design or default, the Trump administration has inadvertently cracked open the door to Russia's return to world energy markets -- potentially on stronger footing than before. The turmoil is already inflating the strategic value of Russian energy; India has secured Washington's approval to continue purchasing Russian oil for three months. Western European countries, having cut Russian gas imports over the Ukraine war and struggling to find reliable alternatives, could face an energy catastrophe if Qatar -- a critical LNG supplier -- curtails production. Whether Europe will quietly knock on Russia's door is an open question, but one thing is not: the war is buying Russia meaningful breathing room in the energy economy.
Great power competition and Iran-centered geopolitical arena
As the US began institutionalizing its stance in the Middle East through the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine, Russia was simultaneously staking its own claim to regional influence through alliances with Syria and Egypt. Likewise, these ancient lands, both in economic and political sense, started to carry more weight for China. Perhaps, a contemporary echo of history's "league of empires" has started to emerge in the north, south, east, and west around the region centered on Iran.
This route functions as the backbone of Trans-Eurasia. Within this framework, Russia is not willing to cede its partner Iran to American influence, while simultaneously seeking ways to convert the crisis into a diplomatic opportunity. In the current environment, Moscow appears well-positioned to pursue a strategy anchored in energy geopolitics -- one that would allow it to sustain its balancing act while carving out new room for maneuver in the broader contest for global power.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.
