- By transforming the island into a forward operating hub for third-party military actors, the GCASC risks fuelling instability both on the island and across the surrounding region.
- In an environment where the GCASC has taken an overt strategic posture aimed at constraining Türkiye from the south, establishing a mutually acceptable settlement in Cyprus and fostering regional stability becomes increasingly unattainable.
- The author is Professor of International Relations at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University.
ISTANBUL
The Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) has signed a new agreement with Lebanon, following similar arrangements with Israel and Egypt. On Nov. 26, GCASC leader Nikos Christodoulides and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun signed an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) delimitation agreement, drawing significant attention. In this agreement, the southern boundary between Lebanon and Israel and the northern boundary between Lebanon and Syria were taken as reference points, and the GCASC–Lebanon EEZ limits were redefined through the "median line" method. The agreement also reveals that the tripoint where the maritime zones of GCASC, Lebanon, and Syria intersect has been identified.
Although the agreement is presented as being of strategic importance—purportedly providing legal certainty for investors in regional energy projects—it has been criticized for producing a disproportionate distribution of maritime space to the detriment of Lebanon. Lebanese opposition circles argue that the arrangement constitutes a "concession of sovereignty" and a "strategic mistake" and has led to the loss of roughly 5,000 km² of maritime area.
Reactions of Türkiye and the TRNC
Despite Lebanon's President Joseph Aoun's assertion that "our cooperation excludes no one", both Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) reacted negatively to the agreement. Türkiye stated that the so-called "Republic of Cyprus" continues to disregard the Turkish Cypriots—who are the island’s co-equal partners—and to ignore Türkiye, the littoral state with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean. TRNC authorities similarly stressed that GCASC does not represent the Turkish Cypriot people and cannot unilaterally take decisions affecting the entire island, declaring the agreement "null and void".
The role of the European Union
The 2020 explosion at the Port of Beirut severely damaged the Lebanese economy, which has since relied heavily on Western financial assistance. There are strong indications that the first tranche (€500 million) of the EU's planned €1 billion aid package has been politically linked to the signing of this agreement. GCASC is also expected to assume an active role in Lebanon within the framework of the "Mediterranean Agreement" which is planned to be announced during its upcoming term as holder of the EU Council Presidency.
Implications for Türkiye and Cyprus
It is anticipated that the GCASC–Lebanon agreement will accelerate hydrocarbon exploration activities in the region, advance international energy projects, and encourage the EU to pursue new natural gas and energy corridors. This development is expected to negatively affect Türkiye’s energy policies, while enabling GCASC to engage in intensified energy cooperation with Egypt, Israel, and other regional actors—potentially leading to political or even military alignment. By bypassing Türkiye and the TRNC, the EU may pursue new energy, electricity, and infrastructure linkages through GCASC, Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon, thereby challenging Türkiye’s aspiration to become an "energy hub". Ultimately, the deal may also pave the way for a future delimitation agreement between GCASC and Syria.
On the other hand, the agreement appears to constitute a new element in the Greek Cypriot side’s longstanding efforts to undermine the sovereign and equal rights of the Turkish Cypriot people. It is argued that the deal not only violates the legitimate rights and interests of the Turkish Cypriots but also fundamentally disrupts the fragile equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean, jeopardizes the shared vision for cooperation, and undermines the principle of equal rights, thereby increasing the risk of conflict.
Although the areas covered by the agreement lie outside the Turkish continental shelf registered before the UN on Mar. 18, 2020, it nevertheless disregards the rights of Turkish Cypriots and is likely to hinder the initiation of intercommunal negotiations sought by newly elected TRNC President Tufan Erhurman, which would have adverse implications for the Cyprus question.
Possible responses by Türkiye and the TRNC
Given that the TRNC possesses equal rights over the natural resources of the island yet faces continuous unilateral actions, it will likely be compelled to adopt political, diplomatic, and technical countermeasures. To demonstrate and safeguard its rights in the island’s maritime areas, the TRNC may need to redeclare its licensing zones—not on the basis of purely geographic considerations, but so as to correspond to all areas previously declared by GCASC. This would highlight Turkish Cypriots’ sovereign equality and reaffirm that unilateral actions will not remain unanswered under the principle of reciprocity. For Türkiye, the most significant step would be to conclude a maritime delimitation agreement with Syria and to base such an arrangement on the northeastern coordinates of its 2011 continental shelf delimitation agreement with the TRNC.
The fundamental issue at stake
The unilateral declaration of an EEZ by the GCASC, disregarding both the Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye, constitutes an unlawful act. In particular, the UN General Assembly’s 1962 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources is significant, as it stipulates that “natural resources belong to the peoples of the territory”, without referring to states. In this sense, it is evident that GCASC’s unilateral and unlawful EEZ declaration amounts to the usurpation of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots.
The validity of the EEZ delimitation agreements that GCASC unilaterally concluded with Egypt in 2003, Lebanon in 2007, and Israel in 2010—along with the subsequent parceling of maritime blocks—forms the core of current disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Essentially, the issue of maritime jurisdiction in the region is tied to the fact that the Greek Cypriots seized control of the "Republic of Cyprus" by force of arms in 1963 and transformed it into a Greek Cypriot state, and, today, the same entity seeks to legitimize its position through EEZ declarations by what is effectively an occupying administration.
What is next?
Regarding future developments, the final maritime delimitation agreement the GCASC is expected to pursue in the Eastern Mediterranean appears to be with Syria. It is evident that such an initiative could only be realized with the political backing of the European Union and the United States. Should the GCASC succeed in concluding this agreement, it would further consolidate its role as a regional actor in the Eastern Mediterranean, supported by its external partners.
Therefore, it is clear that the GCASC cannot contribute to peace or stability on the island through policies that disregard the TRNC and the Turkish Cypriot people. Moreover, by transforming the island into a forward operating hub for third-party military actors, the GCASC risks fuelling instability both on the island and across the surrounding region. In an environment where the GCASC has taken an overt strategic posture aimed at constraining Türkiye from the south, establishing a mutually acceptable settlement in Cyprus and fostering regional stability becomes increasingly unattainable.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.
