• Military advantage is increasingly determined by the agility of innovation systems and the resilience of the organizational and industrial structures that sustain them.
• Contemporary conflicts indicate that warfare is in a clear transitional phase, with emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and advanced sensors reshaping how military power is generated and applied.

The author is a defense analyst.

ISTANBUL

The pace and character of warfare have undergone a profound transformation over the past decade. Conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Middle East have demonstrated a fundamental shift in how wars are fought and how militaries, defense industries, and governments respond to emerging threats. Rapid technological advances are challenging traditional strategic thinking, force deployment, and procurement models, as modern battlefields increasingly demand mass, adaptability, and tolerance for attrition alongside precision, speed, and agility.

The evolution of drone design, production, and employment exemplifies this transformation. The widespread use of first-person view (FPV) drones in the Russo-Ukrainian War highlights how low-cost, rapidly adaptable systems can generate significant battlefield effects. Their effectiveness against expensive and sophisticated platforms has reignited long-standing debates about the balance between innovation and doctrine, as well as the future relevance of manned fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, and other high-end systems. Militaries are once again confronted with the challenge of integrating disruptive technologies without undermining established force structures.

The impact of drones in "democratizing" battlefield effectiveness can be assessed through three interlinked questions. First, is doctrine reshaping the defense industry, or is industrial reality driving doctrinal change? Second, how and why are defense firms transitioning from sophisticated systems of systems platforms to scalable, low-cost systems? Third, how can middle-power nations with strong drone and precision-strike capabilities generate a strategic advantage even if they lag behind major powers in classical heavy platforms?

Operational requirements versus industrial processes

Throughout military history, doctrine has both shaped technological development and adapted to it. The current cycle is distinctive in that it is driven not only by state-led defense R&D but also by the rapid diffusion of dual-use technologies. Enabled by computer-aided design and manufacturing, rapid prototyping, and agile management practices, start-ups and small firms can now respond to battlefield requirements far faster than traditional defense primes.

Frontline experimentation is rapidly converted into institutional knowledge and industrial demand. According to Martin Joesaar of the EU Defense Innovation Office in Kyiv, innovation cycles in the war in Ukraine have shortened to just two to six weeks, allowing new threats and operational requirements to be addressed in near real time. Russia's conversion of the Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition into the domestically produced Geran-2 illustrates this process. Based on frontline feedback, the system was upgraded to include jam-resistant navigation, electro-optical targeting, and two-way datalinks, enhancing its operational effectiveness.

Decision-making processes, particularly the sensor-to-shooter cycle, further drive this transformation. Legacy C4I architectures rely on hierarchical authorization chains that struggle to keep pace with fast-moving, highly dynamic battlefields. Meanwhile, the proliferation of missiles and armed drones increases cognitive load on human operators, compressing decision timelines.

As a result, industrial responsiveness has become a doctrinal requirement. Modern military concepts increasingly assume that civilian and dual-use industries will iterate faster and more cost-effectively than traditional procurement systems. Defense firms, in turn, can sustain demand only by continuously aligning their designs with operational realities observed in near real time.

Industry response: Attritable, scalable, and effective

A recent Hudson Institute study by Tsiporah Fried suggests that drones account for up to 75 percent of battlefield losses on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides.[1] While striking, this figure does not necessarily signal the emergence of an entirely new generation of warfare. Rather, the war in Ukraine once again validates the maxim that necessity is the mother of invention.

Until early 2023, drones in Ukraine were used predominantly for reconnaissance, target acquisition, fire correction, and battle damage assessment. Ukraine also employed Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 armed drones with notable success, conducting precision strikes against Russian mechanized units and logistics lines. Small and micro-sized drones carrying explosives existed prior to 2023, including commercial platforms adapted for grenade drops or kamikaze attacks, but their role remained limited.

FPV drones became a defining feature of the conflict only after battlefield momentum stalled and front lines stabilized. From 2023 onward, both Russian and Ukrainian forces began systematically integrating FPV drones into small-unit operations. The battlefield increasingly resembled a postmodern variant of First World War trench warfare, with soldiers maneuvering through trenches and shell craters under constant threat from fast, low-flying drones.

Several structural factors contributed to this shift: Russia's inability to establish full air superiority, Ukraine's effective use of decentralized small-unit tactics combining anti-tank guided missiles and drones, and Russia's extensive manpower and materiel reserves. FPV drones emerged as a response to these conditions, not as their cause. Consequently, the war's kinetic dimension has evolved into a competition between opposing organizational, industrial, and innovation ecosystems. In this sense, it is not merely platforms that are fighting, but rival innovation systems adapting under pressure.

Opportunities and assets for middle powers

Mid-sized states with regional ambitions face inherent constraints in financing high-cost platforms such as combat aircraft, air defense systems, and major naval assets. Yet operational autonomy requires some degree of defense-industrial self-reliance, which cannot be achieved through imports alone. In this context, armed unmanned aerial vehicles have emerged as an effective force multiplier, particularly against asymmetric threats, as Türkiye has demonstrated.

Armed surveillance drones equipped with precision-guided munitions significantly shorten the sensor-to-shooter cycle. From 2015 onward, Türkiye integrated indigenous miniature guided bombs onto Bayraktar TB2 and ANKA drones for counterterrorism operations against the PKK. This capability enabled rapid engagement of targets upon detection, especially in rugged terrain. Supported by robust intelligence and communications networks, drones neutralized time-critical targets and severely constrained the mobility and operational flexibility of terrorist groups. Similar concepts were later employed in Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya, where drones conducted precision strikes against armored units, artillery, and air defense systems, contributing decisively to battlefield outcomes.

A central enabler of this success was close synchronization between military doctrine and the defense industry. Rather than evolving sequentially, technology and doctrine were co-developed through rapid feedback loops driven by frontline operational needs. The Turkish defense industry's embedded and responsive working culture proved critical to this process.

Drones also generate disproportionate effects against adversaries slow to adapt. In Ukraine, Bayraktar TB2s played a key role in the early phase of the war by enabling precise strikes on Russian logistics convoys and providing time-sensitive targeting for ground forces, contributing to the disruption of Russia's initial advance.

Conclusion

Contemporary conflicts indicate that warfare is in a clear transitional phase, with emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and advanced sensors, reshaping how military power is generated and applied. Evidence from Ukraine, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Middle East points to three interrelated trends that are likely to define the future character of war.

First, AI-enabled and autonomous systems are forcing militaries to adapt their decision-making architectures. Decentralized command and control, once a doctrinal preference, is increasingly a necessity, as compressed sensor-to-shooter cycles demand greater initiative at lower echelons.

Second, concepts of protection and survivability are shifting away from reliance on heavily armored, exquisite platforms toward quantity, dispersion, and replaceability. In high-attrition environments, numerically limited but technologically superior systems struggle to offset the effectiveness of affordable, scalable, and sufficiently capable alternatives. Mass and adaptability have re-emerged as critical determinants of battlefield endurance.

Third, defense industry capacity has become an integral element of warfighting power rather than a supporting function. Industrial policy is now inseparable from defense policy, as sustained combat effectiveness depends on the ability to produce, adapt, and replace systems at scale. The most competitive defense ecosystems are those that can simultaneously preserve high-end technological excellence and field attritable systems without incurring strategic shock.

Taken together, these dynamics suggest that success in future warfare will depend less on individual platforms and more on the alignment of doctrine, technology, and industrial responsiveness. Military advantage is increasingly determined by the agility of innovation systems and the resilience of the organizational and industrial structures that sustain them.

[1] https://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/impact-drones-battlefield-lessons-russian-ukraine-war-french-perspective-tsiporah-fried

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.