OPINION - 'McDonald’s peace' hits drone wall: The new grammar of military-geopolitics
The world once promised by liberal ideas and globalization is receding. As the Berlin Wall gives way to a European Drone Wall, 2026, the post–Cold War illusion is over. The years ahead, beginning in 2026, will lead to the world of guns.
The author is a senior fellow at the Washington-based Hudson Institute.
- Global political-military outlooks for 2026 can be framed under two scenarios: risky and very risky. The risky scenario is another round of 12-day war. The scenario with truly global-scale conflict menace is a direct US-China clash around Taiwan.
ISTANBUL
The fall of the Berlin Wall nearly 36 years ago put an end to the Cold War and gave an era marked by optimism and integration. Within a year, McDonald’s opened its first restaurant in Russia, followed by another in Ukraine. The Iron Curtain appeared to be replaced by a shared commercial language, where markets and consumer brands mushroomed. As Europe pursued deeper political integration, the late 1990s were characterized by momentum. In this context, Thomas Friedman introduced the "McDonald's Peace Theory," which argued that no two countries with McDonald’s had ever gone to war with each other.
That optimism has faded. The ideals of liberal globalization have confronted the reelpolitik. In February 2022, Russian combat formations invaded Ukraine, challenging the belief that economic calculus could ever limit geopolitical expansionism. By January 2025, Ukraine’s first McDonald’s was tragically struck by a Russian missile. Months later, Russian Gerbera drones, decoys of the Iranian Shahed baseline, were shot down over Polish airspace, putting the European drone wall plans on steroids.
The new face of conflict
The year 2025 marks a period in which the risk of conflict has risen noticeably on a global scale compared to the previous year, while a lasting formula to end the Russia-Ukraine War still remains out of sight. As Europe confronts hard geopolitical realities it long postponed, the ongoing war has also brought about a profound change in how modern warfare is understood.
The Middle East continues to host conflicts as well. The Iran-Israel 12-day war does not have a diplomatic closure. Taiwan scenarios, for their part, make the powder keg that the world sits on.
The Russia-Ukraine front has turned into a next-gen war lab, where traditional military capabilities and emerging and disruptive technologies are intertwined on the same battlefield. Robotic systems have already assumed principal roles in both belligerent’s CONOPS (concept of operations). According to Ukrainian sources, Ukraine has reached a production capacity of over 200,000 unmanned aerial vehicles per month, with a particular focus on FPV-based platforms. Data compiled from the field and operational analyses indicate that roughly 60-70 percent of Russian assets destroyed or damaged by the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been struck by tactical drones. [1]
Nonetheless, it is clear we are not talking about some "magic weapons." The same studies show that between 60 and 80 percent of FPV drones are destroyed before they ever engage their preys. In the tactical segment, drones, particularly the FPVs, tend to resemble bio-species that reproduce in large numbers but lose most of their offspring. That is why the equation of low unit cost and high industrial output can outperform the equation of high unit cost and state-of-the-art defense technology married to limited industrial scale.
Another mention of 2025 was Operation Spiderweb. Carried out by Ukrainian intelligence, the plot infiltrated Russian trucks logistics networks, expanded into telecommunications and cellphone operators to control the drones, and culminated in strikes on strategic-bomber nests. The key lesson is hard to miss: in 21st century warfare, 'rear area' no longer offers safety. Anywhere can become a target.
The 12-Day War ranked among 2025's most critical confrontations. Among the many lessons to be drawn, one stands out: Israel's ability to penetrate Iranian airspace with fifth generation F 35I platforms combining sensor fusion with a high level of low observability, often described as stealth capability. Also critical were Israel's large-scale campaign to hunt mobile ballistic missile launchers inside Iranian airspace and the early assassinations of senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders, which briefly paralyzed Iran's ability to respond at the outset of the hostilities.
Nonetheless, Iran's missile operations and its defense industrial infrastructure could not be fully neutralized. Including the final day of the fighting, Iran sustained its ballistic missile salvos, albeit at a lower operational tempo. Indeed, the cost of protecting Israeli airspace for 12 days using the United States Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems amounted to 25 percent of the interceptors in THAAD's inventory.
Critical milestones in Türkiye's defense industry
For Türkiye's defense industry, some of the most consequential developments in 2025 were the concept tests Baykar conducted with its AKINCI and KIZILELMA platforms. KIZILELMA's air-to-air missile trials and autonomous wingman formation flight, along with the AKINCI-KEMANKEŞ test runs, mark notable steps in Türkiye's drive to build hyper-war capabilities.
In 2025, ROKETSAN's work on the TAYFUN ballistic missile was another notable milestone. Most European nations of NATO lack tactical ballistic missile and even heavy multiple-launch rocket systems prowess. Turkish defense industry, thus, has been filling an important gap within the alliance.
TAYFUN differs from the ballistic missiles we are used to seeing in most Middle Eastern conflicts. Simply put: it is not an area missile. Test results indicated a bullseye accuracy for the missile. Tayfun Block 4, unveiled at the International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF 2025), will move the baseline to a whole new level. Although its operational range has not been officially disclosed, open-source indicators suggest it will have a longer range than earlier variants. Such a precise missile that can spend much of its flight path at hypersonic speed constitutes a genuine deterrent capability.
In 2025, the defense deal reached between Ankara and London for the procurement of Eurofighter Typhoons was another notable development. Until KAAN enters service, Türkiye faces a serious need for a stopgap solution for its air warfare deterrent.
Finally, Türkiye’s shipbuilding infrastructure also deserves attention for its ability in 2025 to execute multiple naval combatant projects in parallel. The rapid rise in Türkiye’s naval platform production capacity matters for the NATO alliance as well. Among the naval modernization efforts in 2025, the National Submarine (MILDEN) program, whose test block entered the construction phase, stands out as one of the most striking trends.
What to expect from 2026?
2026 will likely be another good year for Türkiye’s defense industry. KIZILELMA’s entry into service is likely to draw significant international attention. And in the first half of 2026, KAAN’s second prototype will probably take to the air.
Global political-military outlooks for 2026 can be framed under two scenarios: risky and very risky. The high-probability and medium-impact scenario is another round of the 12-day war, since the fighting has not been brought to a definitive diplomatic conclusion. But, the spillover prospects of the conflict would remain largely confined to the Middle East. The scenario with truly global-scale conflict menace, though still low probability for now, is a direct US-China engagement centered around Taiwan. In such a case, a worldwide domino effect would be almost inevitable.
One thing, however, is certain, the world once promised by liberal ideas and globalization is receding. Now rises a harsher order, defined less by peace and integration than by military fortification. After decades, the Berlin Wall gave way to a European drone wall. The post–Cold War illusion is over. The years ahead, beginning in 2026, will lead to the world of guns.
[1] Jack Watling ve Nick Reynolds, Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo–Ukrainian War, RUSI, 2025.
* Opinions expressed in this article are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.
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