- Beyond rebuilding national forces, European governments must push change within NATO to strengthen its European pillar, especially in command structures. These are no longer radical ideas, but the price it must pay to remain master of its destiny

- The author is a defense and security policy analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre

ISTANBUL

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has once again warned that Russia could be in a position to attack NATO within the next four years. While most European countries have rolled out ambitious plans to boost defense readiness, acquire new weapons systems, and, in some cases, reintroduce forms of military service for younger generations, Europe is still struggling to translate urgency into action.

Never-ending saga of Russian sovereign assets

Nothing exposes Europe’s difficulty in acting as a decisive geopolitical player more clearly than its paralysis over the use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. The question of whether to deploy these funds to back a vital loan for a war-ravaged country has dragged on for months.

The legal case for using the assets is strong, and the risk of Russian legal retaliation against Belgium, where most of the funds are held, is widely considered limited. Yet European leaders, and Belgium in particular, have failed to agree on a way forward, repeatedly postponing a decision and asking the European Commission to come up with alternative solutions.

At the same time, reports of Russian hybrid activity affecting European infrastructure, businesses, and public institutions have increased, and Russian officials often frame Europe as a party obstructing a settlement unless its terms align with Russia's stated demands. Moscow has made clear its desire to roll back NATO’s post-1997 enlargement and to restore a sphere of influence reminiscent of the Soviet era.

Against this backdrop, Europe's difficulty turning frozen Russian sovereign assets into predictable support for Ukraine sits uneasily with the severity of its own threat assessments and has created a growing perception gap.

Passivity on Ukraine

Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, European countries have provided unprecedented military and diplomatic support to Kyiv, surpassing that of the United States. Yet Europe has remained largely passive in response to Washington's peace negotiations. Rather than trying to shape the process, European leaders have adopted a reactive posture, limiting their role to accommodating defined US objectives and blocking the most damaging proposals, such as sweeping territorial concessions in Donbas.

The recent summit in Berlin involving the United States, Ukraine and several European leaders produced a show of unity that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz described as a "chance for a real peace process." It included talk of NATO-style security guarantees and reaffirmed that any territorial decisions rest with Ukraine.

However, it is doubtful that Russia will accept these conditions. More likely, the Kremlin may be reluctant to accept the conditions as presented, use the talks to deepen the division between Europeans and Americans, and shift blame onto President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, whom it calls an "illegitimate leader."

Europe's re-armament

As an attack by Russia on NATO cannot be ruled out in the foreseeable future, European countries have responded with an unprecedented intensification of their military preparedness. However, while on paper European NATO troops outnumber those of Russia, in practice, without NATO’s US-led command structure, Europe remains fragmented.

Washington made clear in its new national security strategy that it wants to shift its focus toward the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific. The language has moved beyond burden sharing to burden shifting. In theory, Europe could shoulder more responsibility. However, US forces provide unified command, strategic enablers, and extensive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that European militaries still lack. If the United States were unwilling to provide these assets, Europe would struggle to operate at scale.

Europe has no command structure beyond NATO and little appetite to build one. The EU is poorly equipped for such a task, not only because it lacks key European military players, such as the UK and Türkiye, but also because EU treaties limit significantly its powers in the defense domain. In that context, even modest initiatives proposed by the European Commission, such as a European drone defense initiative, have faced resistance from member states determined to keep control in the capitals. The emerging coalition of the willing remains little more than a series of meetings, not a parallel European command capable of planning, commanding, and controlling military operations.

The picture is further complicated by signs that the Trump administration could seek renewed engagement with Moscow, potentially including sanctions relief. Such a shift could increase Europe’s uncertainty about deterrence and crisis management, especially if US engagement became less predictable during a period of heightened tension with Russia.

Bold actions needed

To weather this moment, Europe must act decisively. Beyond rebuilding national forces, European governments must push institutional change within NATO to strengthen its European pillar, especially in command structures. These are no longer radical ideas, but the price Europe must pay to remain master of its own destiny.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.