LONDON

Britain’s high-profile purchase of fighter jets capable of carrying nuclear bombs is a largely "diplomatic gesture" that offers “no obvious military advantage,” a new report warned on Friday.

At the NATO Summit in June 2025, the UK government announced plans to purchase 12 F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and to join NATO’s “dual capable aircraft nuclear mission”—a move described by the government as “the biggest strengthening of the UK’s nuclear posture in a generation.”

However, a new investigation by the Nuclear Information Service and Nukewatch UK argues that the decision is driven more by political motives than military need.

It said the move is intended to provide “political ‘smoke and mirrors’ to distract attention from questions relating to the US–Europe relationship within NATO” rather than to create a “must-have military capability.”

The UK’s Trident nuclear weapons system is already assigned to NATO, and the government’s new initiative raises questions about whether it was “driven by strategic necessity or political expediency.”

Although the decision has been linked to the 2025 Strategic Defense Review, the report notes that the review “downplayed the idea of UK participation in the mission and emphasized that the option still needed a detailed study.”

The study suggests that the announcement’s timing—coinciding with the NATO Summit—reflects a desire to reinforce unity within the alliance.

It says the move was “influenced by a desire to bolster political solidarity within the alliance, particularly in light of US President Donald Trump’s perceived lack of commitment to NATO and concerns that NATO’s European members are not contributing enough to NATO.”

According to the report, the purchase “serves more as a diplomatic gesture than a military imperative,” duplicating existing European NATO capabilities and remaining dependent on US systems.

Before joining NATO’s nuclear sharing program, the UK faced several hurdles.

The government expects the F-35As “to start being delivered before the end of the decade.”

But, even without delays, “it will be years, rather than months, before they are available for operation,” the report said.

Maintenance issues could mean that “at best only 8 aircraft would be available to take part in a nuclear strike.”

The study also highlights key operational dependencies.

The B61 nuclear weapons, central to the NATO mission, “remain under US control, rendering the operation entirely dependent on American permission.”

Furthermore, squadrons must meet “rigorous certification standards” from the US Air Force, a process that “can be a lengthy program extending over many months.”

The Royal Air Force also plans to use the F-35A aircraft for training, raising “questions about operational nuclear readiness.”

The government has justified the purchase on three grounds: strengthening NATO deterrence, filling a “capability gap” between conventional and nuclear strikes, and cost efficiency.

But the study concludes that “it is difficult to see what useful role the UK can add to the NATO nuclear mission.”

It notes that “the UK’s Trident nuclear weapons system is already committed at all times to NATO use” and that “the UK already pulls its weight in terms of contributing to NATO’s nuclear capability.”