Betul Dogan Akkas
05 May 2023•Update: 05 May 2023
The author is a researcher in the Arab Gulf States. She holds a Ph.D. in government and international affairs from Durham University. In her research, she examines foreign policy, security strategies, and political culture in the GCC states. Dogan-Akkas also covers the involvement of the GCC states in the Yemen war and Türkiye-GCC relations.
ISTANBUL
President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the ruler of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan appointed [1] his son Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan as crown prince after almost a year from his ascendance to the country’s presidency. Yet, he changes in the UAE’s bureaucratic mechanism and Abu Dhabi’s political elites haven’t stayed with the de facto formulation of accession rule-descending from father to son.
Sheikh Mohamed's 3 full brothers from "Bani Fatima Block" were appointed in different positions even one of them newly invented position: the vice president of the UAE. Starting with the most controversial one, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who is currently owner of Manchester City, is elevated [2] to the position of vice president of the UAE which is a role traditionally under the federal rule of Dubai’s emir Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. Shaikh Mansour and his father-in-law, Shaikh Al Maktoum will share this post, which makes the discussions surrounding further centralization of the UAE prominent. In Sheikh Mohamed's mid-Ramadan changes, Shaikh Tahnoon and Shaikh Hazza were named [3] deputy rulers of Abu Dhabi.
The initial reaction is to read these landmark decisions as footstep towards further centralization of power in the UAE at the hands of Sheikh Mohamed including his own son and his brothers from "Bani Fatima Block" to the power circle.
Dr Mira Al Hussein, who is a Cambridge University alumni and currently an Alwaleed Early Career Fellow at Edinburgh University interprets the changes as shedding light on the reality in the ground. She stated: "The federation as we have traditionally known has ceased to exist for quite a while. Abu Dhabi did not need to make official appointments to confirm that; it is quite evident in how every aspect of governance is centralized to the extent that our passport are no longer issued in our respective emirates but have to go through a central system before being issued."
Will the centralization benefit citizens?
If this is the case and if the UAE moves to a de facto structure of central governance around Abu Dhabi’s political elites, will there be more benefits for the citizens? Al Hussein aptly avers practical angles for the citizens and the division of labor among seven emirates: "From a state logic, maintaining a federation seems rather costly. Not long ago, conversations emerged that Abu Dhabi was carrying the financial burden of the union and that the other emirates should pull their weight and contribute, too. The other emirates have made a contribution in kind, though not financial, given their limited natural resources. Manpower comes from the northern emirates and the army is predominantly staffed by citizens from the northern emirates. The idea that other emirates should contribute to the federal budget, then, was not directed at citizens but at the ruling elites of these emirates, who are increasingly perceived as a burden on the national budget whereas Abu Dhabi is the economic and political powerhouse of the state."
What Al Hussein defines is an established rentier system as the rest of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) experience for the decades yet displaying unique characteristic of federal rule. The Emirati form of rentierism has dual forms. An exchange of services and welfare between state and citizens is the first and conventional definition. The second practice of rentierism is among the ruling elites of 7 emirates with acknowledging the power embedded in Abu Dhabi in exchange of economic, security benefits and an international prestige of the Emirati brand for them and their citizens. Al Hussein touches upon the importance of a maneuver power that is both for the citizens and ruling elites once the centralization of power is unavoidable and practical. She says: "I think those who dismiss the possibility of an UAE unified under one ruling family are deferring an uncomfortable conversation. The maintenance of figureheads will prove costly with time and Abu Dhabi will be under no obligation to maintain the status quo since legislative, executive and judicial powers as well as economic all lie within the prerogative of the central government. I think with time we might see bolder and public actions to confirm the federalizing of Abu Dhabi and its ruling family, and that will become particularly evident when succession matters arise in Dubai.
Demise of the federal system or a division of roles?
Another common approach reading the changes in the Emirati bureaucracy does not depict the form of governance in the Emirates as demise of the federal system. Rather, as Dr. Khalifa Al Suwaidi from Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy shares his views [4] on Twitter, “This is more about creating a division of roles within a technocratic system”. Al Suwaidi defines the centralization of power around Abu Dhabi’s political elites as an advantage that all Emiratis will benefit economically as more integration will bring economic growth. Al Suwaidi also disagree with defining the Emiratis “as passive and lacking in agency” towards those changes and he sees them rather involved in these processes with indicating their “popular acceptance and consent”.
The role or acceptance of the citizens is a contested area as the central focus is an authoritarian state with tribal mechanisms, despite obvious and progressive liberal policies in the social and economic activities. If these bureaucratic changes and evolving social realities are based on “a flexible governance”, [5] as Sheikh Al Maktoum states, even if they are completely designed by the political elites, what will be their reactions in the societal horizon? This is where boosting national identity and centralized governance comes together.
The effects of centralism: Steps to top-down nationalism
I asked Al Hussein whether she sees the nationalism and nationalistic support among the Emirates in the same vein with their approach to the centralization of power by Sheikh Mohamed. She answered: "In the past, the country’s first higher education institution,UAE University which brought together students from different emirates had served as a congregational site within which Emirati identity was articulated and rehearsed. The establishment of new institutions and local campuses rendered the university redundant in that endeavor. The introduction of military conscription provided a new platform for assembly wherein a cohesive Emirati identity can be rehearsed within the contexts of nationalism, patriotism and productive citizenship.
Centralization of power around the idea of ‘an Emirati state’ and an Emirati identity through the institutions and ceremonies can help Sheikh Mohamed to ease this bureaucratic process while the society is adapting to changes. This is a state-led, top-down construction of national identity yet it could help the political elites to brand the central governance around a nationalist narrative of being ‘Emirati’. Put differently, the more centralized rule can come with a more nationalist official narrative to convince the crowds, yet this is not a popular will or consent. Sacrificing for the nation in the oversea wars like Yemen, introduction of a nation-wide military service, massive national day celebrations and heritage festivals, the concept of martyrdom in Yemen war, declaration of a Commemoration Day and establishment of more national museums and sites like the Wahat Al Karama memorial are examples for the official attempts to boost Emirati identity and to reach a unified nationalism amid 7 diverse sets of rules. Sheikh Mohamed's rising leadership surrounding centralization of governance is, thus, closely related to Emirati identity in the future.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.
