Turkish army in WWI: combination of weakness and strength

By Mustafa Caglayan

NEW YORK

Although the Ottoman Empire had been in an unstoppable decline beginning as early as the 17th century, the question of whether or not it was truly doomed to fail in the First World War remains to be answered by historians.

In fact, its ineluctable entry to "the war to end all wars" 100 years ago Wednesday would spell the end of the 600-year-old empire, which had once stretched from Budapest south to Mecca, and from Baghdad west to Algiers.

Even so, the condition of its army offered a mysterious combination of weakness and strength, which enabled it to survive the Russian, German and Austrian empires by several years.

So, how could the army of “the sick man of Europe” wage a multi-front war against some of the most capable armies of the era?

"The strong points of the Ottoman army in the First World War were its exceptional group of talented commanders (who were mostly general staff officers), its system of creating and maintaining infantry divisions, and the fierce determination of its soldiers," Dr. Edward J. Erickson, arguably the most prominent authority on the Turkish army during World War I, told The Anadolu Agency via e-mail.

He said this enabled the army to sustain itself over the long duration of the war against industrialized and resource-rich enemies, including the British and Russian empires.

"The Ottoman army was resilient and was capable of rapid marches and operational maneuvers. In essence, it was a highly mobile army that could also fight very hard defensively. It was almost impossible until 1918 to push Ottoman soldiers out of defensive positions."

But although the war officially ended with an Allied victory, there were Ottoman positions that refused to abide by the armistice of Mudros and refused to lay down their arms. In one incident, Fahreddin Pasha, defender of Islam's second holiest city, Madina, refused to hand over his battalion’s arms even upon receipt of a direct order from the Ottoman government in October 1918.

After months of tenacious defense of the holy city, besieged by pro-British Arab tribes, the garrison surrendered in late January 1919 due to lack of supplies.

This lack of supplies, caused by an "abysmal logistical posture," was in fact the weakest point of the Ottoman army, according to Erickson.

"Over and over, and in every theater, the Ottoman army lacked weapons, ammunition, food, fodder and medical supplies. Moreover, the empire’s antique railroad and transportation system hindered the resupply and communications of the armies deployed on the front lines."

The Ottoman army recovered unexpectedly well from a humiliating defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 partly because its new generation leaders, particularly Enver Pasha, led a determined effort to correct many of the problems in leadership, training and organization that the defeat had exposed.

However, considering that the post-1918 remnants of the army, led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, waged a successful war of independence driven by a massive campaign of supply building, it can be speculated that the Ottoman leadership could have done more to eliminate its logistics problem.

After all, from the ashes of the empire would rise a modern Turkish republic, still one of most powerful and influential countries in the region.

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