ISTANBUL
Oral ÇALIŞLAR
The terrorist PKK hurled occasional threats of resuming violence as the resolution process was in progress. As a journalist who has kept a close watch on the region for many years, I was witness to the positive developments underway there. The social and economic life had been revitalized, with the number of cafes, restaurants, tourist facilities, and art galleries rising and becoming common sights in the cities of the region, and primarily in Diyarbakir.
Significant progress had been achieved in the political sphere as well. Owing to the resolution process, remarkable steps had been taken in the field of Kurdish demands regarding law and their rights.
In an atmosphere where such important steps were taken successfully, I did not believe it possible for the PKK to return to the old days, or rather, to even consider it an option to go back to its politics of violence. I did not think this was a realistic option in that it could not possibly garner the support of the people.
Misperception of Kobani
Despite the odds, the PKK took up arms again. And this time, it went down a path that we had not seen it take before. It attempted an insurrection campaign through urban warfare.
It seems that the experience they gained from the Syrian town of Kobani led them to apply the same methods in Turkey. They apparently thought they could achieve the same results in Turkey.
However, there were great differences between the two experiences: the Syrian Kurds in Kobani who were defending the town against Daesh were, in doing so, defending their lands, possessions, property, shops, businesses, and above all, their lives. Losing meant extinction for them.
Yet this was not the case for the Kurds living in Cizre, Sur, or Silopi; they did not face such a threat. The houses they lived in belonged to them, as did their shops, and with the fruitful developments of the resolution process, they had become richer. The conflict-free period brought about by the resolution process had provided them with a secure environment for their lives and property.
So, what exactly did they have in mind while digging the ditches? They were confronted by a situation that bore no resemblance to the Kobani experience. It was also out of the question for them to achieve anything by declaring autonomy through a fait accompli.
On the contrary, because of the ditches they dug, they came face to face with a situation now threatening their lives, homes, and workplaces. Providing support to the PKK's politics of ditch-digging meant getting embroiled in a disaster that would cost them everything.
But they were powerless in the face of PKK militants who came knocking on their doors, guns in hand. Even the slightest attempt to oppose their militancy was met with heavy violence. So they saw leaving as their only option. Towns were quickly evacuated.
I have quite a few close friends and acquaintances in the towns where these incidences were unfolding. At first they objected. In turn they were threatened. And then they tried to migrate elsewhere. They left their homes. Their homes were confiscated. They were declared "traitors".
The politics of ditch-digging, as the PKK's experiment in uprising, ended in a fiasco. It was the first time in their history they were dealt such a heavy blow. More importantly, the people of the region challenged them openly for the first time, and the PKK lost much of the public support it had to a certain extent secured.
The HDP becoming a dysfunctional organization
As for the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), their stance and situation during this process proved to be a complete disappointment. They first demanded that the PKK lay down its weapons. They were able to reason that the 13 percent of the national vote that they won in the general elections would mean nothing in a violent environment. They thus initially opposed the ditches and barricades.
However, harsh threats or stern warnings from the PKK rendered them unable to stand up for their demand. They eventually yielded to the PKK's impositions and ended up subscribing to the policy of digging ditches. Their inability to clearly distance themselves from violence and following a submissive policy toward the PKK violence made them politically ineffectual and dysfunctional.
Public response
The locals hopelessly watched the HDP's passive stance and impotence in creating solutions and largely lost their confidence in them.
Now it is the local people that are paying the price for the PKK's attempted "uprising" and the HDP's policy of tagging behind the terrorist group. Towns have been burnt and destroyed. There is still no peace in sight in many cities. No hope for the future. Desperation prevails.
Going back to what I said earlier: If the resolution process had not been launched at all, the local people might not have distanced themselves so strongly from the politics of violence. Past experience had taught them what they could win and what they could lose.
The PKK has thus suffered a major defeat. The HDP, with its electorate numbering in millions, failed to deliver on its responsibility. And the highest price has been paid by the people of the region.
Now it is time to dress the wounds.
The most fundamental issue standing right before us is to ensure that all the weapons in the region fall silent once and for all. And secondly, serious political and legal reforms must be launched in order to meet the very legitimate democratization demands of the Kurds.
The efforts to put together a new constitution may turn out to be a fresh opportunity and a new beginning.
We should also watch the HDP's active participation in parliament’s work [to form a new constitution] once they realize their mistake.
