- The author is Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

ISTANBUL

The Russia-Ukraine war has generated a lot of sympathy for Ukrainians, but Ukraine is not naturally perceived as a country with a lot of impact on the future of the planet. The repercussions of this war are being felt by many through disruptions in food and energy security, although not as existential ones. By contrast, any framework agreed in order to sort this war out will be felt everywhere as a key set of precedents. That is why understanding what’s at stake is critical.

Identity and sovereignty

It's almost a commonplace to believe that a lack of security or at least its perception – especially eventual Ukraine’s NATO membership - has led Russia to start the war. But this logic sounds internally inconsistent, as Finland’s NATO membership should have created even deeper sense of trouble in Moscow. Even more so, the occupation of the Crimea started in 2014 when Ukraine was not just legally, but constitutionally, a “non-block” state. The real reason is that this war is about identity and sovereignty. Russia rejects any significant Ukrainian identity – from language and history to statehood – and wants to limit Ukraine’s sovereignty in four critical dimensions. The first one is territory, where Russia wants to get control of the part of the sovereign and legally recognized Ukrainian land. The second is to critically reduce Ukrainian military capabilities in order to destroy any chance to deter future aggression. The third one is to have a veto right over Ukraine’s foreign policy, including with whom and how to interact. Formally it refers only to the NATO membership, but in fact it’s about keeping Ukraine in the Russian sphere of exclusive influence. And the last one is about being able to impact domestic politics, especially cultural and religious dimensions.

Any sustainable peace can be reached only if Moscow is ready to accept that Ukraine should be sovereign in its decisions and define its domestic and foreign policy on the basis of democratic principles. All that is unreal at the moment. But durable peace can be achieved as a result of credible security guarantees. They should be credible to those they would be provided to, to those who would provide them and of course against those who would be considered as a primary threat. Any future deal can only hold if such guarantees are an indispensable part of it. It’s close to impossible to produce the much needed level of credibility when even the NATO Article 5 is under discussion. The minimal “credibility benchmark” should consist of at least two fundamental pieces: the legally-binding nature of any guarantees and an agreed clear-cut set of measures like financial and military support to enable the Ukrainian defence forces and its security sector to deter an aggression.

And the burning point of all discussions is what guarantors can commit to – from financial support to actual fighting engagement. The current discussions are based on the formula “Europe delivers, US supports”, but its credibility for Moscow is in question.

Territory and non-recognition

The second dimension of any possible "endgame" should entice a legal and political non-recognition of temporarily occupied territories, so a factual control over a certain territory can’t be confused with recognizing it. For Ukraine, this is not just a political issue – it’s about a deep emotion for pretty much everyone in the country. But doing otherwise would also create a “chain reaction” precedent for fragmenting the whole body of international rules and their selective application or non-application. The further very probable repercussion would be a tsunami of nuclear and other WMD proliferation as the only way to deter an aggressor.

The Russian request to give up part of the Donetsk region is unacceptable not just politically, but also would create a critical security gap. Leaving a heavily fortified area would mean giving Moscow almost an unlimited freedom to attack in the future.

The third existential dimension is what capabilities the Ukrainian military should possess, both in terms of quantity and quality. Even when symmetric capabilities with Russia are problematic to achieve, there has to be a way to deliver on asymmetric deterrence.

Any opinion poll carried out in Ukraine clearly showed that the absolute majority of Ukrainians are not willing to make concessions on these issues, understanding that they are fundamental for the security of Ukraine and any durable peace is not possible without sorting them out. Overall, the critical line of any deal should be to retain Ukraine’s sovereignty and deterrence capabilities.

On top of all the issues mentioned, there should be others sorted out, like the status and operation mode of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant or modalities for monitoring and verification of a ceasefire, where the US should take a leading role.

The next European security architecture

Having said that, Ukraine can be secure only as part of a wider security architecture – either European or Transatlantic – and the discussions on that will necessarily start at some point in time as the previous European security model based on Helsinki principles is dead. Without that, any solution can become durable, based on a set of credible security guarantees, but not a sustainable one. But what could be agreed around Ukraine will provide a point of departure for any further discussions on deterrence, security guarantees, or commitments, as well as probably identity issues.

Türkiye is uniquely positioned to try to provide good services in order to achieve a just and sustainable peace, as it knows too well from history the identity differences between Ukraine and Russia. It is also highly conscious of the evolving geopolitics in a wider European area and the threats coming from them, being able to credibly talk to all key players at the same time.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.