- The author is a French journalist.

ISTANBUL

France’s political deadlock is no longer a temporary impasse produced by unfavorable parliamentary time limits. It is increasingly revealing itself as a structural problem, shaped by institutional rigidity apparent in a fragmented National Assembly, as well as an electoral calendar that actively discourages compromise. As budget negotiations stall, and as political actors look ahead to the March municipal elections and further still to next year’s presidential race, governing France has become less about much-needed reform and more about mere survival.

At the center of this stalemate stands French President Emmanuel Macron, whose second term was always expected to be far more constrained than his first. Since his loss of a working majority, Macron’s ability to convert presidential authority into legislative outcomes has been sharply reduced. The result is a difficult paradox of power, embodied in a strong presidency that perforce operates within a cumbersome political system that increasingly produces political paralysis.

That paralysis, sadly, has not been compensated for by the emergence of a stable parliamentary alternative. The National Assembly is divided into three large blocs: the president’s centrist party, the left alliance, and the far right. None of these can govern alone, so none has any incentive to cooperate with the other two. Unlike in systems accustomed to coalition politics, compromise in France remains politically costly and institutionally underdeveloped.

The most immediate expression of this deadlock is the ongoing budget crisis. France’s annual finance law is constitutionally set in stone; however, it is proving to be economically and politically toxic. The government must somehow reconcile fiscal consolidation with social pressure while also navigating a National Assembly in which no bloc has incentive to take responsibility for unpopular choices.

Public support for Macron’s economic agenda has steadily eroded since the pension reform battle. This narrowed the space for compromise and turned budgetary debate into a zero-sum confrontation. That erosion matters greatly in France. Pension reform was not merely a social conflict but a political turning point. It hardened the opposition’s populist distrust, weakened centrist legitimacy, and made any further necessary fiscal adjustments far easier to contest than to defend. Since then, budget negotiations have increasingly taken place in a climate of mutual suspicion, rather than shared constraint and concern for the nation.

Fiscal constraints and the eurozone buffer

The fiscal backdrop is unforgiving. France is now projected to run a deficit that is well above the European Union’s 3% reference threshold in 2026, with public debt hovering around 110% of GDP. Servicing costs are rising fast as interest rates normalize, further limiting maneuvering room. These constraints make delay risky but do not make agreement easier in a parliament defined by crippling vetoes. Unlike smaller eurozone states, France has so far been shielded from acute market pressure by its size and its central role within the monetary union. That buffer, however, has reduced external economic discipline, allowing political deadlock to persist without triggering a crisis that might otherwise have enforced compromise.

It is in this context that the question of Article 49.3 has resurfaced. In his policy speech to the National Assembly in October, Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu said his government would not rely on the constitutional mechanism allowing legislation to be adopted without a vote, unless it was overturned by a motion of no confidence. The pledge was intended to mark a break with years of procedural governance and signal renewed respect for parliamentary debate.

As negotiations over the 2026 budget remained deadlocked, the credibility of that commitment appeared under strain. Constitutionally, the use of Article 49.3 for budgetary legislation is legal. Politically, however, it had become a high-risk option. Any invocation of it would immediately expose the government to motions of censure, with no guarantee of survival given the volatility of the assembly. Refusing to use it, meanwhile, risked prolonged paralysis and damage to France’s fiscal credibility.

In a stark confirmation of the depth of the impasse, Lecornu has now announced he will use Article 49.3 to push the 2026 budget through Parliament without a vote, directly contravening his earlier pledge and exposing his government to motions of no confidence in an effort to break months of legislative deadlock. Opposition parties are expected to introduce motions of no confidence in response, though the likelihood of any single motion securing an absolute majority remains low, given the continued reluctance of the left and far right to coordinate their votes.

Institutional mismatch and the road to 2027

This dilemma reflects a deeper institutional mismatch. The Fifth Republic was designed to produce clear majorities and decisive leadership. It functions far less smoothly in an era of fragmented politics and declining party discipline. Minority governments can survive, but only by governing defensively—by managing constraints rather than advancing reforms. Structural change becomes politically irrational when electoral punishment is perceived as more likely than political reward.

The electoral calendar merely reinforces this. The municipal elections this March, though local, also serve as a national test of political momentum and party organization ahead of the 2027 presidential elections. For opposition parties, obstructing the government carries few immediate costs and even potential electoral benefits. For Macron’s camp, concessions risk alienating an already fragile support base. With the president constitutionally barred from seeking another term, many political actors are now positioning themselves for long-term succession rather than presenting compromise.

This dynamic sharply limits Macron’s capacity to implement structural reforms during the remainder of his term. Any major economic overhaul would require cross-party cooperation that is currently absent. Governance, therefore, is increasingly reduced to tactical management: passing what can be passed, delaying what cannot, and containing further crises where possible. Stability is preserved, but at the cost of strategic direction.

Is France entering a new era of political instability? Not in the sense of imminent collapse. Institutions continue to function, administrations operate, and international commitments are honored. However, political instability has become chronic rather than episodic. Decision-making is brittle, increasingly shaped by electoral calculation and parliamentary obstruction.

Looking ahead to 2026, expectations of what can be achieved must be tempered. Sweeping reforms are unlikely. Budget battles will remain central, and constitutional tools will continue to hover as last-resort options rather than pragmatic instruments. Macron’s presidency remains powerful in form, but it is nevertheless constrained in practice. The final phase of his term is shaping up to be less about transformation than about containment—limiting fiscal drift, preserving institutional credibility, and preventing paralysis from turning into a dangerous rupture.

France’s political deadlock is no longer an accident of circumstance. Quite the contrary, it has metamorphosed into the defining condition of its present political profile.

​​​​​​​*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.