OPINION - Kurds in the shadow of the past: To be a tool or to be an actor?

- The author is a researcher

ISTANBUL

With the accelerated pace of joint US-Israeli military operations against Iran in late February 2026, the region has entered a dark tunnel of unprecedented geopolitical tensions. At the heart of this explosive landscape, statements by US President Donald Trump have emerged as a decisive factor in redrawing the map of alliances and confrontations. Following the announcement of the death of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in combined airstrikes, Trump emphasized that these attacks would continue "without interruption" for weeks, in an attempt to impose a new reality under the banner of "global peace" and to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear and long-range missile capabilities. In the midst of this aerial escalation targeting Iranian military infrastructure, the outlines of a new American strategy have begun to unfold, seeking to draw Kurdish parties into the heart of this confrontation.

Reports from Axios, The Washington Post, and The New York Times confirm that President Trump conducted extensive communications in early March 2026 with prominent Iraqi Kurdish leaders, chief among them Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani, in addition to Iranian Kurdish leaders such as Mustafa Hijri. These contacts were not merely routine coordination; they included explicit offers of logistical support and comprehensive air cover to encourage Kurdish forces to launch a ground campaign deep inside Iran, aiming to destabilize the regime from within and spark a widespread popular uprising. Trump explicitly stated to Reuters news agency, "I think it's a great idea if they want to do that, I'd be totally with it," in a clear reference to his desire to see a Kurdish "victory" on the ground to complement the results of the airstrikes. Despite attempts by the White House to soften the tone of these remarks, the facts on the ground confirm the strategic and dangerous nature of these maneuvers.

The Trump administration's recourse to the Kurds reflects a "proxy war" strategy designed to avoid entanglement in a direct ground war that could cost the United States dearly in human casualties, especially after American fatalities in the early days of the operations. This vision is based on the organized military strength of the Peshmerga forces and their long experience in combating terrorism, as well as the strategic geographic location of the Iraqi Kurdish region as a western gateway to Iran. Washington also views the Iranian Kurdish groups, stationed in rugged mountainous areas, as an effective tool to weaken Tehran internally and drain its remaining military capabilities following the intensive airstrikes.

Conversely, the Iranian response was violent and direct, with Tehran vowing "decisive suppression" of any activities it labeled as "separatist." It translated its threats into missile strikes targeting opposition Kurdish camps in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, resulting in civilian casualties. This escalation reflects the regime's fear of internal disintegration and the exploitation of ethnic groups amidst its current weakness. The Kurdish position, meanwhile, appears more cautious and complex; while Kurdish leaders recognize the magnitude of American pressure, they lean towards "self-distancing" to avoid paying a heavy price in a conflict where the American stance could shift at any moment, mindful of the bitterness of abandonment at previous historical junctures, from the 1991 uprising to the sudden withdrawal from Syria in 2019.

Words from Shanaz Ibrahim Ahmed

In this context, the stance taken by Shanaz Ibrahim Ahmed (wife of Iraq President Abdul Latif Rashid, and aunt of PUK leader Bafel Talabani) clearly articulated popular and official Kurdish rejection of these overtures. In a statement posted on her account in US social media platform X during the first days of March 2026, she declared in a decisive tone:

"Today, the Kurds of Iraq have finally tasted a measure of stability and dignity in life. This is why it is very difficult, indeed impossible, for the Kurds to accept being treated as pawns by the world's great powers. The experiences are there. The empty promises are there. All too often, the Kurds are only remembered when their strength or sacrifice is needed. That is why I appeal to all parties involved in this conflict. Leave the Kurds alone. We are not mercenaries."

This statement, represents a high-level female and political voice articulating the collective Kurdish memory and its categorical rejection of any role as a proxy in the conflicts of others. This position aligns with the cautious official discourse of the Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)'s leadership and reinforces the idea of neutrality as the sole strategic option to avoid repeating historical experiences of betrayal.

Only viable option

The harsh lessons inscribed in Kurdish history in blood compel the Iraqi Kurdish region to adhere to strategic neutrality as the only viable option for survival. The Kurds have long been a "card" used in the conflicts of major powers, only to be sacrificed at the first political settlement. Today, in the absence of genuine international guarantees and given the enduring reality of Iran as a permanent neighbor, yielding to American promises poses an existential risk that could lead to the destruction of national achievements and the eruption of internal instability. The interest of the Kurdish people lies in strengthening internal unity and economic development, far removed from the gambles of external powers.

Herein also lies a historical responsibility on the shoulders of Iranian Kurdish leaders, who today face a similar American temptation that could lead them to bear the burdens of a confrontation whose consequences they alone cannot manage. Bitter experience has taught the Kurds that trusting American promises without tangible guarantees is a perilous existential adventure, especially given the fluctuations of US foreign policy, which does not hesitate to abandon its allies when priorities change.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.