OPINION - Another normalization story: Expectations for Erdogan-Trump White House meeting
Erdogan-Trump meeting could be turning point in improving bilateral relations and regional issues. What matters is that the 2 countries respect each other's interests and concerns and achieve tangible gains through a win-win approach

The author, a political scientist, is an associate professor at Hasan Kalyoncu University in Gaziantep, Türkiye, and senior researcher at the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), a think tank based in Ankara, the Turkish capital.
ISTANBUL
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and US President Donald Trump are intensifying their meetings and diplomatic efforts on the sidelines of this year’s UN General Assembly in New York. After a Sept. 23 meeting with Arab and Muslim country leaders on Gaza, the two leaders will meet one-on-one on Sept. 25 to discuss bilateral relations. Since Erdogan's last visit to the White House back in November 2019, the two leaders have met only once, at a NATO summit this June.
Due to the Biden administration's approach to Türkiye, relations between the two countries have been tense over the past four years. Despite shared interests, this period of divergence on regional issues resulted in little more than symbolic engagement. In fact, wars and crises in the region and around Türkiye have limited bilateral relations and led to cautious dialogue.
Trump's perception of Türkiye
While former President Joe Biden was in office, Türkiye, which chose to remain completely neutral during Trump's campaign to return to the White House, did not comment on the US elections, which are an internal US matter. Even when Trump's chances of winning grew clear, Türkiye did not engage in unethical actions, such as praising Trump or making political investments for the post-election period. For this reason, Trump maintained a balanced approach in his statements about Türkiye.
During his 2024 campaign, Trump openly supported President Erdogan while criticizing the mistakes made by Biden and former President Barack Obama on Türkiye. Despite these comments, it is essential to recall that Trump's first term was marked by numerous crises and challenges. A series of negative events remains fresh in people's minds. However, it appears that Trump weighed the positives and negatives of his first term before deciding to seek a second. In light of this, he did not speak a single negative word about Türkiye or President Erdogan during his campaign for another term. Thus, the Trump-Erdogan meeting is expected to take place in a constructive rather than a confrontational atmosphere.
It is well known that the US lost Arab and Muslim states and the Muslim public due to its support for Israel's aggression. Therefore, Trump may try to take advantage of President Erdogan's appeal to Muslims during the Sept. 25 meeting. So it is likely that the meeting will focus on constructive and concrete steps, particularly in the context of bilateral relations and beyond. These topics can be briefly summarized to outline the key expectations.
Intent behind shaping Turkish-US relations
Türkiye's growing strategic autonomy, driven by security concerns, is viewed by the US as an "axis shift." Senators who told President Erdogan during his last visit to the White House to "return home (to the West)" instead of to Russia are still remembered. In fact, the White House wants a "controllable" Türkiye. However, such an expectation does not align with Türkiye's actual role and capabilities.
Turkiye has a significant influence in Syria, Libya, Africa, the Balkans, and the South Caucasus. Its ability to engage in dialogue simultaneously with Serbs and Bosnians, Ukraine and Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Erbil and Baghdad, as well as Benghazi and Tripoli, is a unique feature. Given these realities, Türkiye expects respect from the US for its interests and awareness of limits. In other words, Türkiye seeks respect for its national policies, which focus on security and prosperity.
Likely top topics
President Erdogan said his meeting with Trump would focus on trade, investment, the defense industry, and military agreements, as well as regional wars and conflicts, with an emphasis on the vision for peace. However, it is crucial to look beyond these issues to stabilize and "normalize" the fluctuations that relations between the two countries have experienced over the past 30 years.
In the context of trade, the 2024 trade volume of approximately $33 billion reflects a balanced distribution. Despite customs duties and tariffs, both countries reached an import-export level of $16 billion. This volume is likely to rise following a recent presidential decree that reduced Turkish customs duties on American goods. With defense industry purchases on the table, the $100 billion bilateral trade target may be achieved. However, it is worth noting that a balanced trade volume is a crucial criterion for Türkiye at this point. In other words, Türkiye must also be able to sell goods to the US or take part in joint projects. At this point, a return to the F-35 project partnership and the end of unfair practices could open a new chapter in trade between the two countries.
In terms of investment, as of 2024 the US had stock of $15 billion in Türkiye. This January-May, Americans contributed 36% of the total $4.727 billion in investment in Türkiye. Therefore, the US was the leading country investing in Türkiye during the first five months. However, this figure remains insufficient considering the financial sector. Additionally, it is known that Turkish companies have invested $12 billion in the US. Given that the total investment volume is $27 billion, aiming for a total of $100 billion in investments would be advantageous.
The defense industry issue is somewhat complex. The negative influence of the Armenian, Greek, and Zionist lobbies on the Senate, known for opposing Türkiye, has historically brought embargoes and sanctions to the table. Trump needs to assert his authority on this matter and persuade lawmakers. However, senators are setting conditions on arms sales. Trump, meanwhile, has gained a positive image with his pro-Türkiye rhetoric. Notable progress has been made, especially on the purchase of F-16s and passenger aircraft. It appears feasible to acquire the engines required for Turkish jet fighter KAAN in the initial phase. Nonetheless, Trump must leverage his influence on the F-35 issue. Still, it's important to remember that the limited number of F-35s Türkiye plans to procure are a temporary solution until KAAN is fully integrated into the Turkish arsenal.
In the pursuit of peace, mediation and facilitation efforts are prioritized. For Trump, the Russia-Ukraine war, and for Erdogan, the conflict in Gaza are two key issues that need resolution. Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as Syria are topics on which the two leaders have reached agreement. However, it's important to note that when the US and Türkiye engage in constructive dialogue on regional issues, it becomes easier to achieve results.
Another issue that Trump is likely to bring up is Türkiye's relations with Russia and China. Trump, who has often expressed concerns about these two countries, may put forward demands to Türkiye. For Trump, new alliances led by China, like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, represent a worst-case scenario.
Issues concerning Israel present a complex situation. The Israeli government, currently negotiating with Syria, has started to identify Türkiye as a threat. A conflict prevention mechanism set up in Baku, Azerbaijan remains operational. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is likely to pressure Trump and lobby him to turn against Türkiye.
As a result, the Erdogan-Trump meeting could be a turning point in improving bilateral ties and on regional issues. What matters is that the two countries respect each other's interests and concerns and that they achieve tangible, not just symbolic, gains through a win-win approach. Within the framework of Türkiye's policy in recent years, normalization with the US can be achieved.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.