-The author is a visiting fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

ISTANBUL 

As 2025 draws to a close, North Africa appears more stable yet more constrained than a decade ago. Relative security has largely been restored, but vulnerabilities related to political legitimacy, economic inclusion, and fiscal sustainability have intensified. The prevailing regional outlook can best be described as one of cautious stagnation and managed instability, in which governments prioritize border control, inter-elite bargaining, and reliance on external financing.

Economic dynamics mirror this ambivalence. High public debt, persistent youth unemployment, and the lagged effects of global food and energy shocks continue to strain the capacity of regional states. Governments face a narrow policy corridor, balancing macroeconomic stabilization against the political costs of structural reform. Egypt illustrates this dilemma clearly. IMF-linked reforms have contributed to improvements in foreign exchange reserves, currency stability, and inflation control, yet austerity measures, subsidy cuts, and public-sector contraction have further intensified social pressures and increased pressure on Egypt’s post-2013 economic order. Tunisia reflects similar patterns: easing inflation and limited growth have stabilized conditions, but without resolving unemployment, subsidy pressures, or regional disparities.

Security vortex in Libya-Sahel-Sudan triangle

North Africa’s security architecture is increasingly shaped by three intersecting arcs of instability, linking Libya, the Sahel, and Sudan. Despite a nominal ceasefire, Libya is still fragmented between rival armed groups and political centers. This prolonged institutional vacuum has become entrenched, with direct spillover effects on Tunisia, Egypt, and the wider Maghreb.

To the south, the sharp increase in militant terrorism, driven by groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS (Daesh) in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the Sahel, increasingly affects North Africa through border militarization, migration politics, and intra-regional diplomatic friction. As repeatedly emphasized by the UN throughout 2025, this dynamic has elevated southern borders from peripheral zones to strategic security fronts in the eyes of North African states. Algeria, long a mediator and stabilizing actor in the Sahel, now faces heightened exposure to spillover risks. The Algeria–Mali dispute, which erupted after a drone incident this March, illustrated how counterterrorism priorities, sovereignty claims, and regional influence can quickly collide.

The Libya–Sudan linkage has further deepened this security vortex. Libya’s fragmented sovereignty, particularly in the east and south, has provided armed Sudanese actors with logistical depth, financial channels, and rear bases. At the same time, Sudan’s civil war has injected new flows of weapons, fighters, and displaced populations into Libya’s already fragile environment. Tribal and trade networks along the Darfur–Libya axis have evolved into militarized corridors connecting war economies. By 2025, this mutually reinforcing dynamic has become a structural feature of North Africa’s security order.

Under these conditions, regional responses increasingly prioritize containment over resolution. Border militarization, intelligence cooperation, and EU-backed migration management have become central tools, mitigating immediate risks, while leaving the underlying drivers of instability largely intact.

Turning points after 2025

In the coming days, three critical turning points could reshape North Africa’s trajectory. The first concerns Libya’s institutional path. The prospect for near-term elections remains unlikely, while institutional contestation persists. However, the November 2025 agreement signed by representatives of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State at the Central Bank indicates that technocratic bargains remain possible. Progress toward a durable fiscal and governance settlement, particularly on oil revenue management, Central Bank authority, and budgetary control, would mitigate the risk of escalation. Failure to reach such a consensus would further fuel the ongoing arms race in Libya, as evidenced by the anticipated Pakistan–LNA arms deal toward the end of 2025.

The second threshold relates to whether destabilizing dynamics originating from the Sahel and Sudan will exceed manageable limits. Escalating cross-border attacks, trafficking networks, and irregular migration flows could push North African states toward more restrictive security policies and deeper securitization in the coming period.

A third turning point lies in the prospects for regional security cooperation. Shared threat perceptions may enable limited but functional coordination, particularly among Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania, yet also deepen the current regional securitization and armament.

The direction of these turning points will be shaped by three structural factors. The first relates to the geoeconomic transformation of the region. Gulf capital, Turkish investments, Europe’s border and energy priorities, and the growing strategic activism of middle powers are reshaping North Africa’s political economy, offering the potential to become a green energy hubs and alternative production bases. As external actors play an increasingly decisive role in the region’s geo-economic and geopolitical transformation, it becomes critical whether these dynamics will reinforce security-centric governance or be translated into investments addressing structural drivers of instability such as unemployment, weak governance, and regional inequality.

Second, whether the cross-border war economies originating in the Sahel and Sudan and extending through southern Libya will consolidate. If the current trajectory continues, these networks generate durable income streams through smuggling, mercenary activity, and the migration economy, reinforcing fragmentation and reducing policy responses to short-term flow management.

Third, Mediterranean and North African dynamics have become analytically inseparable, producing a transmission zone: insecurities originating in the Sahel, political volatility in Libya, energy price shocks, and migration pressures flow northward, while policy responses and conflict dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean are projected southward.

Türkiye’s regional calculus

As North Africa moves toward 2026, Türkiye’s regional profile is best understood as a differentiated engagement strategy, with Libya as its strategic anchor and the wider Maghreb as a space for economic and diplomatic engagement. Libya remains the country in which Ankara is structurally embedded, through sustained military cooperation, defense sector institutionalization, and maritime and energy linkages, making it a central pillar of Türkiye’s Eastern Mediterranean strategy.

Looking ahead, Türkiye’s priorities in Libya are likely to focus on mitigating security and political risks and reframing its presence as part of a broader post-conflict engagement. Beyond Libya, Ankara has deliberately avoided deep securitization. It positions itself as an industrial and commercial partner in Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt, with a growing trade and manufacturing footprint while maintaining diplomatic and economic engagement in Tunisia without heavy financial conditionality. Türkiye’s influence in North Africa through 2026 will therefore depend on leveraging diplomatic flexibility and economic depth, while managing the risks inherent in Libya’s fragile equilibrium.

​​​​​​​*Opinions expressed in this article are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.