Opinion

OPINION - New German conscription law: When will Berlin achieve a genuine turnaround in security policy?

The issue of compulsory military service highlights the dilemma of German security policy, which has long suffered from a lack of strategic guidelines and a continuing imbalance between political leadership with the armed forces and the society

Prof. Ulrich Schlie  | 27.11.2025 - Update : 27.11.2025
OPINION - New German conscription law: When will Berlin achieve a genuine turnaround in security policy?

The author is the director of the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies (CASSIS) at the University of Bonn.

ISTANBUL

When the German government passed the new military service law proposed by German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius at the end of August, the minister was visibly proud of what he had achieved. It was intended to be a major change, securing the target of 270,000 soldiers for the Bundeswehr by 2035. Pistorius is relying on voluntary service and a series of financial and service-related incentives to attract more applicants to the Bundeswehr.

By 2035, the Bundeswehr is expected to field at least 260,000 professional soldiers and civilian employees, as well as more than 200,000 reservists. The bill is one of a series of reforms in recent years that have also attempted to use incentives to make military service more attractive.

However, Pistorius's draft bill has sidestepped the real issue, which is ending the suspension of conscription for basic military service that was decided in 2010. This is mainly due to the political sensitivities of the coalition partner SPD, the party of Defense Minister Pistorius, which agreed early on when it entered the coalition government to spare young people in Germany from having to return to compulsory military service.

The solution now agreed is only a lazy compromise

The majority of security policy experts rejected Pistorius' draft bill because it is clear that a half-hearted solution is being proposed for political reasons. Even before the bill passed its first reading in the Bundestag, the CDU/CSU voiced criticism, even though the federal government under German Chancellor Friedrich Merz had approved it jointly. This led to the unusual parliamentary procedure of the draft bill being amended in a party-political compromise between the CDU/CSU and SPD before it even entered parliamentary debate. The solution now agreed clearly bears the hallmarks of a lazy compromise.

All young men born in 2008 or later will still be required to fill out a questionnaire from 2026 onwards, which will form the basis for a later call-up. Nevertheless, the principle of voluntariness still applies. If there are not enough volunteers, the compromise allows the Bundestag to decide whether young men should be recruited by lottery. This lottery system, which would lead to delays in the event of a threat, was controversial from the outset, but has been deemed compliant with the Basic Law by 400 constitutional lawyers.

The compromise that has now been reached stipulates that the German Bundestag must be consulted before activation. Defense Minister Pistorius has also described the compromise that has now been reached as a very good solution. He is confident that no further fundamental changes will be made in the upcoming legislative process in the committees of the German Bundestag and that the law can come into force as planned on Jan. 1 2026. It is very likely that this will indeed happen, as Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a supporter of the grand coalition, is unlikely to spoil the party for his party colleague Pistorius with a veto.

The back-and-forth over the new military service law is indicative of the difficulties German politicians are having in finding a satisfactory response to the new strategic situation. There is still no political concept for bringing about a fundamental realignment of security policy, which is urgently needed. The National Security Council, which was decided upon by the new federal government in the coalition agreement, is also still waiting to be established. German politicians love compromise, and this often leads to the lowest common denominator.

The issue of compulsory military service is a good (or bad) example of the reluctance of German politicians to make decisions. The Social Democrats appear to be prisoners of their own positions and promises and have not yet found the strength to take stock honestly, admit their past mistakes, and draw the necessary conclusions. The CDU and CSU are fighting within the grand coalition with the SPD to push through economic policy and other relevant fundamental reforms and are prepared to make further concessions to their coalition partner in a whole range of policy areas.

Conscription as a mirror of Germany's strategic dilemma

The issue of compulsory military service highlights the dilemma of German security policy, which has long suffered from a lack of strategic guidelines, a genuine analysis of existing deficits, and a continuing imbalance between political leadership and the armed forces on the one hand and society on the other. When, if not in the current situation, should the suspension of conscription for basic military service, which can be decided by a simple majority in the Bundestag and Bundesrat, be reversed due to the strategic situation?

The shortcomings of the security policy debate in Germany are also linked to the fact that, despite the fundamental political decisions made in the coalition agreement and the exceptional allocation of sufficient financial resources, no strategy has yet been developed for expanding the industrial base in line with the strategic situation. Berlin has always struggled with decisions on military equipment and overall national defense.

When Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul emphasized the strategic importance of Türkiye as a good friend during their recent trips, this was long overdue and reflects a correct understanding of the changing political framework.

However, words must be followed by deeds. That is why there is still a long way to go to achieve a joint UAV. Anyone who has followed the debates on the procurement of armed drones in Germany over the last 15 years has seen just how slow the process can be. It is hoped that the long-overdue realignment of security policy will actually take place in the near future, on the basis of a realistic strategic policy document and a whole series of changes to the armed forces’ capability profile, equipment, personnel levels, and even the overall form of national defense.

The organizational restructuring of the Foreign Office just announced by Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul also shows that awareness of the new situation is gaining ground. The changes to the internal structure now decided upon in the Foreign Office were long overdue. They will contribute to a better positioning of German foreign policy and focus more strongly than before on national interests. It is to be hoped that this example will also lead to similar adjustments to the new strategic situation being made in other areas, such as the Bundeswehr and the Federal Intelligence Service. However, it remains crucial that the German population gradually realizes that fundamental strategic changes across many policy areas require a rethink and a departure from cherished habits and patterns of thinking.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.

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