- Horn of Africa expert Michael Woldemariam says this is ‘a confrontation for dominance between two of the more relevant and powerful countries’ in the region
- Any conflict would carry major risks for both sides, with outcomes ‘very difficult to predict,’ warns analyst
ISTANBUL
The Horn of Africa could once again be teetering on the edge of war as neighbors Ethiopia and Eritrea engage in a cycle of escalating rhetoric.
Eritrea, once an Italian colony, was tethered to Ethiopia in 1952, only to spark a three-decade struggle for independence that finally drew to a close in 1991.
The initial period of cooperation, with shared ports at Assab and Massawa, and the promise of cross-border trade soon gave way to suspicion and hostility.
By 1998, longstanding grievances sparked a two-year war that killed tens of thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands, followed by nearly two decades of unresolved tensions.
The fragile accord of 2018, when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed accepted a long-disputed boundary ruling and earned the Nobel Peace Prize, hinted at reconciliation.
But, two years later, war broke out between Ethiopian federal forces and Tigray rebels, after the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) attacked army bases in the north.
The TPLF, the dominant force in Ethiopian politics for nearly three decades, waged war against the government for two brutal years before the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 brought the fighting to an end.
The deal quieted the front lines but left behind deep fractures and lingering tension across the north.
‘Confrontation for prominence and dominance’
While the Pretoria Agreement achieved a cessation of hostilities, it was also a starting point for tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, said Michael Woldemariam, an associate professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy who focuses on armed conflict in the Horn of Africa.
Eritrean troops joined Ethiopia’s federal forces in the Tigray war, hoping to help deliver a decisive defeat to the TPLF. But Asmara was angered when the Ethiopian government struck a bilateral deal with the TPLF that ended the war without Eritrea at the table.
Eritrean officials, he said, “feel as if the TPLF was effectively saved by the Pretoria Agreement.”
He added that during the war, tensions had simmered over military and political strategy and tactics, especially as the TPLF was able to recover.
The group launched offensives beyond Tigray into Amhara and Afar in northern Ethiopia – a chain of events that further strained the Eritrea-Ethiopia relationship and effectively broke their strategic partnership.
“The TPLF factor had been, initially, the most prominent consideration that had driven Eritrea and Ethiopia together,” Woldemariam told Anadolu.
Ethiopia’s push to secure Red Sea access, including its interest in the Eritrean port of Assab, has become another key factor driving tensions, he added.
In October 2023, Prime Minister Abiy declared access to the Red Sea “an existential matter” for Ethiopia, saying he would “use force” to free the country from its “geographic prison.”
Woldemariam said Ethiopia sees itself facing severe economic and security challenges without port access, and from the government’s perspective, pursuing port access also plays well domestically amid internal divisions.
Eritrea, on the other hand, views itself as having been “forcibly colonized” by Ethiopia, an experience fueling the “historic concern” of Ethiopian control.
Eritrea’s alleged role in Ethiopia’s internal politics, which Ethiopian officials and political actors have long called interference, is another source of tension.
Both countries face significant strategic constraints, yet they have long clashed over dominance and influence in the Horn of Africa: “I think what you are seeing is a confrontation for prominence and for dominance between two of the more relevant and powerful countries in the Horn of Africa,” Woldemariam said.
‘Mediation the only viable strategy’
With nearly 120 million people and no direct access to the Red Sea since Eritrea’s independence, Ethiopia sought new maritime options by signing a deal in January 2024 with Somalia’s breakaway region of Somaliland to use the port of Berbera, prompting Somali accusations of a sovereignty breach.
Türkiye mediated talks that produced the Ankara Declaration in December 2024, under which Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to work toward bilateral arrangements allowing Ethiopia sea access under Somali sovereign authority.
But Woldemariam said Ethiopia has now shifted back toward pursuing the Assab port.
“Mediation is really the only viable strategy for de-escalating tensions at this moment,” he said.
Woldemariam doubts the two governments, along with the various armed actors in Tigray, Amhara and Afar, who would also shape any conflict, can de-escalate the situation on their own.
He argued that external engagement and leverage will be necessary, and that an “all-of-the-above approach is the right one in terms of who can mediate.”
Abiy, in late October, called for international mediation with Eritrea over access to the sea.
Woldemariam argued that the US has a critical role to play as “still the most prominent, most important power,” while actors such as Egypt, the Gulf states and Türkiye have become key players in the Horn of Africa through their economic weight and security ties.
He added that the African Union and key African states must also be involved.
“These are much-maligned actors when it comes to peace diplomacy in Africa,” he said, “but I think the long-term stability, both of this region and the continent, requires a strong African role, a strong African voice.”
He said a coordinated mediation effort that brings all these actors into one framework – similar to attempts made in Sudan – could offer the best chance of meaningful progress.
“The path of war for both sides is really quite risky,” Woldemariam said, adding that the outcome of a potential conflict between the two countries and the various actors in northern Ethiopia is “very difficult to predict.”
“I think that’s one of the reasons that we have not seen conflict erupt thus far,” he said.
He argued that the most logical and reasonable path, which “both sides understand,” is dialogue and consultation over their differences, including Ethiopian port access, while fully respecting Eritrean sovereignty and addressing Eritrea’s alleged involvement with opposition to the Ethiopian government.
“It seems fairly obvious that the strategic aims of the parties are not likely to be met through violence,” Woldemariam said. “I think the path of violence is very uncertain.”
