Europeans increasingly accept the need to spend more on defense as the continent faces new security threats and growing doubts over US protection. But when it comes to paying for it, support has clear limits.
Polling of nearly 19,500 people across 15 European countries by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) found growing support for higher defense spending compared with 2025, alongside declining confidence that the US would come to Europe's defense.
Yet just 39% of the poll's respondents supported some reductions in public spending to fund national defense investment, while 45% opposed such a trade-off and 17% were undecided.
"There is a real window at the moment that is supportive of efforts to increase European defense spending and defense investment," Jana Kobzova, co-director of ECFR's European Security Programme, told Anadolu.
"But it's also very clear from the survey that this support is conditional."
While voters increasingly recognize that the security situation around Europe has changed, Kobzova said economic pressures remain their most urgent concern.
They are effectively telling governments that they understand the case for investing more in defense, she said.
"We understand why you're doing this. We understand that the security situation around Europe has changed. We understand that the transatlantic relationship has changed. We know we need to invest more. We support it," she said, summarizing the public mood.
But voters have another message for their governments.
"You also need to look after our most important priority at the moment, which is the economic squeeze," she added.
Support for reducing public expenditure to fund defense varied sharply across Europe.
It was strongest in Estonia, where 55% backed the proposal and 34% opposed it. The Netherlands followed with 54% support and 32% opposition.
In Poland, 49% supported the trade-off, compared with 30% who opposed it, while 21% remained undecided. Portugal recorded 47% support and 36% opposition.
In both France and the UK, 43% supported cuts in other areas of public spending to fund defense, while 40% opposed them.
Elsewhere, opposition exceeded support.
In Sweden, 38% backed the proposal and 43% rejected it. Denmark recorded 37% support and 51% opposition, while in Switzerland the figures were 37% and 50%, respectively.
Resistance was more pronounced in southern and central Europe.
In Spain, 32% supported reductions in public expenditure for defense, while 54% opposed them. Around 30% of Germans supported the trade-off, compared with 56% who rejected it. In Austria, support stood at 28% and opposition at 59%.
Italy registered the strongest opposition among the countries surveyed, with only around one-fifth of respondents backing the proposal and 63% opposed.
Kobzova said the national differences could not be explained by geography alone. Historical experience, political culture, confidence in government, fiscal pressures and perceptions of immediate military threats all shape public attitudes.
“I think it’s all of the above,” she said when asked whether the variations were primarily driven by threat perception, trust or national political traditions.
Northern and eastern European countries generally have stronger traditions of military preparedness and tend to perceive Russia as a more immediate threat, she said.
"They've been used to investing in their own armies," Kobzova said of the Scandinavian countries, pointing to a tradition of greater self-reliance in meeting national security needs.
By contrast, military preparedness became less of a priority in parts of Europe after the Cold War.
The survey, published this summer, also exposed a growing divide between Europeans' confidence in their neighbors and their faith in the US as a security partner.
When respondents were asked whether other European countries would help defend them in the event of an attack, confidence was positive across almost the entire sample, with Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden recording particularly strong levels.
“Even among the voters of very Eurosceptic parties, they still believe that their European neighbors would come and help them,” Kobzova said.
By contrast, net confidence that the US would intervene was negative in every country shown in the survey.
The findings point to a growing belief that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security, even as many Europeans remain reluctant to write off the transatlantic relationship altogether.
“A lot of them think this is a break, not a breakup,” she said.
Many Europeans appear to believe relations with Washington could recover after a future change in US political leadership.
European governments, however, cannot build long-term defense plans around the most optimistic assumptions about future US policy, she argued.
“It’s the responsibility of our political leaders not to plan for best-case scenarios but to plan for worst-case scenarios,” she said.
Trust between Europe and the US has been significantly damaged since President Donald Trump returned to the White House, Kobzova said, with European leaders increasingly expecting that the initial response to a security crisis would have to come from Europe.
"The lessons the European leaders are learning are that any response is not going to start in Washington," she said. "It's going to start with European determination to address the challenges that they might face."
The US could still play an important role, she argued, but may be slower, more selective and more demanding of its allies.
"The US is not going to be the first responder, but they may still be a responder," she said. "They might come a bit later."
Europeans are more receptive to defense spending when the money is linked to building the continent's own industrial capacity.
The survey found broad backing for purchasing weapons from European manufacturers rather than suppliers outside the continent. Net support was positive in almost every country surveyed, with Denmark recording the strongest result.
The pattern was largely reversed when respondents were asked about buying more weapons from the US. Net support was negative across nearly the entire sample, with Poland the main exception.
The findings suggest voters are not opposed to defense investment in principle. Many are more receptive when spending strengthens European companies, expands industrial capacity and reduces dependence on outside suppliers.
“What matters is not just how much is spent, but how it is spent,” Kobzova said.
Voters expect "competent governments making good decisions," she added, suggesting that sustained public support will depend on whether defense programs deliver credible military capabilities and visible economic benefits.
“Some of the strategic capabilities are for now only with the US,” she said, adding that replacing them “is not going to take a year.”
Europe's investment decisions will also have to reflect the changing character of warfare demonstrated in Ukraine, including the large-scale use of drones, missiles and integrated air-defense systems.
Germany illustrates both the scale and the political difficulty of that transition. As Europe's largest economy, its ability to turn higher spending into lasting military capacity will be critical to the continent's broader push to take greater responsibility for its own defense.
Berlin has committed itself to a major expansion of its armed forces, but German voters remain deeply divided over the financial implications. Around 30% supported cuts in other areas of public spending for defense, while 56% opposed them.
Kobzova said Germany's hesitation must be understood in the context of its post-war political history.
"Germany's history of the past 80 years shows that the country is, sometimes for all the right reasons historically, afraid of its own power," she said.
Europe's post-war security system was built partly around the assumption that Germany would not need to develop overwhelming military strength because it could rely on NATO, the US and its European partners.
But that caution is increasingly colliding with demands for Germany to assume a greater security role.
“There is a recognition that that change is needed,” Kobzova said.
But recognition alone will not guarantee political consent.
“It takes time, it needs political stability, and it needs sustained leadership and attention,” she said.
The challenge facing Germany reflects a broader dilemma across Europe: How far can governments increase defense spending if voters see it coming at the expense of public services or living standards?
Kobzova compared that shift to paying more to insure a home as the risks around it increase.
For decades, many European states felt relatively secure, allowing governments to keep defense budgets limited while relying heavily on the US for protection.
“If your house was in a safe place, your insurance was quite low,” she said.
But as the risks facing Europe have grown, so has the cost of security.
“Our insurance premium in Europe has gone up,” Kobzova said.
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