The author is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Latin America, Russian Academy of Sciences.
US policy toward Cuba has been aggressive in character since the very dawn of the two nations' independent histories. This is rooted in fundamental contradictions embedded at the level of their respective national interests. Washington had manifested expansionist ambitions toward the neighboring island long before an independent Cuba even existed.
The wounded national consciousness of the Cubans -- whose victory in the War of Independence (1895–1899) was effectively undermined by the United States – the contempt of ordinary citizens for the puppet government that came to power after 1902, and their desire to throw off the neo-colonial yoke of their northern neighbor: all of this awaited its historical moment.
Targeting the vulnerabilities of Cuba
There is no doubt that the hardline US policy toward Cuba is a well-calculated, consistent strategy that has consciously targeted the most vulnerable points of the Cuban economy – that is, the welfare of the nation. At the same time, the consequences of the embargo, maintained for over 65 years and significantly intensified in recent decades, are presented as failures of governance within Cuba itself. In this regard, a particularly telling statement was made by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Richard Rubottom Jr. in 1960: "The approved program [of the blockade – K.M.] allows us to support elements in Cuba opposed to the Castro government, while making Castro's fall appear to be the result of his own mistakes."
In reality, however, US sanctions are the single root cause of nearly all of Cuba's socioeconomic hardships. They provide the initial impetus that constantly pushes the country toward crisis. For instance, the widespread blackouts in Cuba do not occur because of political mismanagement or the absence of democracy or multiparty politics. Rather, they happen because thermal power plants break down due to US sanctions restricting access to necessary spare parts for scheduled maintenance. Today, Cuban thermoelectric plants cannot operate normally because they require oil -- and the main cause of the electricity crisis lies precisely in the oil blockade imposed by the Trump administration in early 2026.
Vietnam example
Claims that Cuba, under more skillful management, could replicate Vietnam's success are unfounded. First, there are fewer than 10 million Cubans, whereas Vietnam has over 100 million people. Second, Cuba's nearest neighbors are among the world's developing economies, while Vietnam is situated in a zone of remarkable economic dynamism. Moreover, Cuba's closest neighbor — the world's leading economic power -- has imposed the harshest and most sustained sanctions against it for decades.
As for democracy, the United States displays a clear inconsistency here as well. It sees no problem with democratic backsliding in countries it considers geopolitical allies. For example, the decision by El Salvador's parliament in 2025 to allow unlimited presidential reelection for El Salvador's President Nayib Bukele was described by US President Donald Trump as an "internal matter" of that country. Former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, sentenced by a US court to 45 years in prison for large-scale drug trafficking, was pardoned by Trump to support Washington's preferred candidate in the 2025 Honduran presidential election. At the same time, US law demands regime change from Cuba -- a country where a change of head of state did take place in 2018, and where the private sector has shown significant growth in a short period. The United States refuses to recognize this, claiming that the state-owned firm GAESA exercises near-total control over the private economy. In short, when examining US–Cuban relations in their historical entirety, it becomes clear that democratic rhetoric plays a subordinate role, while US hegemonic ambition, compounded by Cold War inertia, takes precedence.
In the face of confrontation with a vastly superior adversary, Cuba has always needed the support of its allies. At the beginning of 2026, its most important ally -- Venezuela -- has effectively withdrawn from the stage following its own political collapse. Mexico, which has always maintained good relations with Havana, has been constrained by Trump's tariff pressure. Russia and China remain traditional allies of Cuba. In recent years, China has been dynamically developing its relations with the island, and Russia has begun exploring ways to assist its ally -- the first step already taken with a shipment of 100,000 barrels of oil as humanitarian aid. But this is insufficient to stabilize the situation. Cuba requires the collective solidarity of the entire Global South — of all the developing nations of the world, of which Cuba has always been a worthy representative.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu
