ANALYSIS - Ukraine war and right-wing populism in Europe

The writer is an assistant professor of political science and international relations at Istanbul Gelisim University

ISTANBUL

In the aftermath of the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine, several commentators and scholars were quick to argue that this war was expected to hugely damage right-wing populist forces and strengthen liberal ones all over Europe. Some were even talking about a "new birth of freedom". For instance, Francis Fukuyama, the author of "The End of History", wrote just a month ago: "Russia is heading for an outright defeat in Ukraine … A Russian defeat will make possible a 'new birth of freedom,' and get us out of our funk about the declining state of global democracy. The spirit of 1989 will live on, thanks to many brave Ukrainians."[1]

It is sad to notice the radically different expectations generated by the Ukraine War compared to the Syrian Civil War seven years ago. While the Syrian refugee crisis led to the thriving of xenophobic, far-right political forces in Europe since 2015, the current Ukrainian refugee crisis is widely expected to reverse this trend and achieve the opposite. As I pointed out also elsewhere [2], such an expectation in itself borders on racism. Why are there such widely divergent expectations and approaches towards groups of people fleeing war and occupation of their country by exactly the same military power? Western countries, along with many commentators and scholars in the West, have yet to answer this question satisfactorily.

Pro-Putin leaders in Hungary and Serbia won

Moving ahead, two very recent developments in the European electoral scene -- the landslide victories of Hungary's and Serbia's right-wing populist leaders last Sunday -- clearly dashed for now the expectations that the war in Ukraine would end the age of populism in Europe and would usher in a new liberal period.

Hungary's long-term conservative leader Viktor Orbán was re-elected for a fourth consecutive term as prime minister by securing 53% of the national vote against a united opposition bloc consisting of six different parties. Likewise, Serbia's President Aleksandar Vučić, a former ally of Slobodan Milošević and his former information minister during the 90s, was re-elected by 60% of the national vote and two new far-right/eurosceptic parties (NADA and Zavetnici) made it to parliament. On election night, the re-elected Vučić even claimed that: "The impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the election results is huge. Serbia has moved dramatically to the right." [3] To top it off, the centrist incumbent Macron will again face the far-right candidate Le Pen in the run-off to the French presidential elections in two weeks. However, the gap between the two has very much been narrowed.

Orbán and Vučić were among the most pro-Putin European leaders before the invasion of Ukraine, and after the war began, they opted for some sort of neutrality despite supporting UN resolutions that condemned the invasion and that suspended Russia's membership in the UN Human Rights Council. Serbia, up to now, has not joined the EU's sanctions against Russia, and Hungary has consistently come against European efforts to sanction Russian energy imports and supply Ukraine with weapons. What explains the landslide election victory of Orbán and Vučić when we consider the severe economic condition in both countries, particularly the united opposition bloc in Hungary? What do these results reveal about voter preferences in the wake of the war in Ukraine? Finally, what should we expect from the French presidential election run-off in two weeks' time?

People favor security and stability

I won't dwell much on Serbia in this piece as there are solid reasons to question the competitiveness of Serbia's elections. For many experts, Serbia under Vučić has been a competitive authoritarian regime, a regime where the playing field is so skewed in favor of the incumbent that it is difficult to have meaningfully free and fair elections. Concerning Vučić's aforementioned claim that Serbia has moved dramatically to the right after last Sunday's election, it seems that this is mostly a narrative that serves Vučić to "justify keeping pro-Russian course and presenting himself as a source of moderation" towards the EU, as Balkans prominent expert Florian Bieber put it. [4]

Hungary tells a different story. Orbán faced the most serious challenge to his rule this time. The hitherto fractured Hungarian opposition had come together in a loose coalition of six parties, in what is hailed as a model to be emulated by Turkish opposition parties, and had strictly framed the elections as a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. Yet, the war in Ukraine eclipsed this message and the economic issues. All of a sudden, security and stability became the primary concerns.

Relations with the EU

Indeed, it seems that the winning card for Orbán was precisely the way he framed these elections in the wake of the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine. By insisting that Hungary would remain neutral in this conflict, would not agree to sanction Russian energy imports and would not agree to supply Ukraine with weapons, Orbán framed the election as a "choice between peace and stability or war and chaos" [5] and accused the opposition bloc that it wanted to drag Hungary into the conflict. And it paid off handsomely for the veteran politician. Uncertainty and turbulent times breed a quest for stability and security, and this seems to account for the preference of Hungarian voters in last Sunday's election.

Orbán secured a majority even in rural districts that were hit hard by the economic crisis. In sum, as a former advisor of Orbán's ruling Fidesz party aptly put it, "people will choose the devil they know" in times of uncertainty. [6] Concerning the relations with the EU, Orbán's re-election does not bode well for Brussels. Hungary's declared neutrality will obstruct European efforts to sanction Russian energy imports in the short term, while Budapest will likely continue to hinder the development of a common European foreign and security policy in areas such as energy diversification, immigration, and human rights in the long run.

What about the French elections?

Finally, in light of these developments, what can be projected for the French presidential election run-off in two weeks? The first round of voting saw Macron's lead margin to have narrowed to about 5%. Still, all major candidates of the Left, with the notable exception of the far-right candidate Eric Zemmour declared that they would support Macron in the run-off. Also, Le Pen perhaps narrowed the gap with Macron mostly because she passed as less extreme than Zemmour.

On the other hand, taking a broader view, Macron's stance on the war in Ukraine has not been substantially different from Orbán's. Indeed, a very recent article in the "The National Interest" lumped together Hungary, France, and Germany as "status quo powers" whose primary motivation is to prevent the war in Ukraine from spreading and reach a diplomatic settlement and restoration of economic ties with Russia. [7] Equally significant, Macron has arguably been the EU's primary interlocutor with Putin both before the invasion and throughout the war up to now. In sum, Macron embodies the quest for security and stability that French voters also will likely prioritize in the run-off. Behaving cautiously in these turbulent times seems to be a trump card electorally.

[1]https://www.americanpurpose.com/blog/fukuyama/preparing-for-defeat/

[2]https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-why-cultural-backlash-against-russians-is-wrong/2526384

[3]https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/08/birn-fact-check-did-serbias-elections-signal-a-further-tilt-to-the-right/

[4]https://twitter.com/fbieber/status/1511672030214733824?cxt=HHwWgIC-nfnsxPopAAAA

[5]https://www.euronews.com/2022/04/03/hungary-election-live-voting-closes-as-viktor-orban-seeks-fifth-term-in-office

[6]https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/04/ukraine-affects-orban-macron-2022-elections/629446/

[7]https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ukraine-crisis-spurs-new-alignments-europe-201497

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency.