By Dr. Makram Rabah
BEIRUT
One of the major challenges for any organization is its ability to avoid setbacks and to maintain and preserve real or perceived victories. But once one reaches the top, it is usually downhill from there.
This is pretty much the case with Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy on the Mediterranean, which -- after surviving a 34-day war with Israel in July 2006 -- proclaimed its so-called “Divine Victory”.
The supposed divine nature of Hezbollah’s endeavor, however, has continuously been on a downward spiral as it was forced to fill the gap created by the exodus of its Syrian ally from Lebanon following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Yet Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2011 to prevent the collapse of the Assad regime was possibly a watershed moment, which has since been proving a slippery slope.
These pressures, which Hezbollah continues to refute, or perhaps ignore, have led it to act in a manner reflecting a clear departure from its usual discretion.
Last week, Hezbollah invited members of the Lebanese and foreign press corps to take a guided tour of the so-called Blue Line, which demarcates the Lebanese-Israeli border, to demonstrate their combat readiness and to mock Israel’s feeble security measures.
This act was not merely meant to provoke Israel, but was also a blatant dare to the Lebanese state as well as the international community.
Hezbollah’s excursion along the Lebanese border is a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which forbids any military presence south of the Litani River with the exception of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and Lebanese Army troops.
While Hezbollah refuses to acknowledge it, Resolution 1701 was an instrumental pillar of its “divine victory” as the government of former PM Fouad Siniora mustered regional and international support to end Israel’s assault on Lebanon.
More importantly, it was the solidarity shown by the Lebanese who opened their homes and towns to their fleeing compatriots from the south that allowed Hezbollah to fight with Israel.
By touring the Blue Line, the hapless Lebanese state, in the person of PM Saad Hariri (accompanied by his defense minister and army chief) tried to salvage what remained of its imagined sovereignty.
Having no real admiration for Hezbollah or its Iranian patrons, Hariri dismissed the stunt as unacceptable, thus exonerating the Lebanese state from any responsibility for the reckless act.
Valuable as that might be, Hariri could have spared himself the trouble of flying all the way to the southern border to deliver this message. He could have simply addressed his statement to either of the two members of Hezbollah who sit in his cabinet.
Likewise, Hariri could have reminded the president of the republic, Michel Aoun, that his earlier statement empowering Hezbollah as a resistance movement was perhaps an additional pretext for its southern incursion.
Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, has on multiple occasions bragged about the party’s fighting doctrine. He underscores his men’s ability to exploit their knowledge of the terrain and use the support of the Lebanese people to vanquish their enemies.
However, most of the steps Hezbollah has taken thus far contradict the aforementioned doctrine.
Thus, Hezbollah's actions have established the Lebanese Shias, who it already uses as human shields, as targets for anyone who desires to punish Hezbollah for its role in the Syrian civil war.
Consequently, Hezbollah’s self-incurred isolation forces it, on many occasions, to flex its muscles to either address domestic political challenges or to simply deliver a message on behalf of its Iranian patrons.
The press tour is simply a case in point. These maneuvers, however, calculated as they may seem, amount to nothing more than gambling with no definite payoff.
Hezbollah’s endless weakening of the Lebanese state, which has shielded it for so long, and its antagonizing of the international community, are both unwise and extremely counterproductive to an organization that relies as heavily on popular support as it does on Iranian largesse.
Scientifically, parasites live off of other organisms without killing their host. This has been the case with Hezbollah ever since its incorporation into the Lebanese state.
However, as it stands, Hezbollah has been steadily morphing into a predator, in the scientific sense of the word, where it has to prey on the Lebanese state for survival and anything standing in the way of its regional agenda.
The only difference is that, while predators have the luxury to look for more prey, the destruction of what remains of the Lebanese state -- at least in the long run -- leaves Hezbollah fully exposed.
Predators as well as rational beings are guided by logic as much as survival instinct and would therefore usually refrain from committing suicide. However, when someone is organically linked to Iran, perhaps its main function is to deliver messages and die for the cause if needed -- a scenario that neither Hezbollah nor the Lebanese at large should look forward to.
Ultimately, the ominous messages that Hezbollah conveys on behalf of its patron should simply be returned to the sender.
The writer is a history lecturer at the American University of Beirut. He is the author of 'A Campus at War: Student Politics at the American University of Beirut, 1967-1975'
*Opinions expressed in this piece are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency
