WASHINGTON
The decade that followed the conclusion of World War II saw the mushrooming of all kinds of international and regional organizations, including the UN, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Arab League.
Anecdotes from the Arab League leave little to be desired. It is said that in one of its meetings, late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein became so angry that he threw an ashtray at his Syrian counterpart, the late Hafez Assad.
In more recent episodes, Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi accused Saudis of selling out to America, prompting a harsh rebuke from then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz.
A similar heated exchange, which included cursing of mustaches, took place between former Iraqi Vice President Izzat Douri and a Kuwaiti delegation.
Like other big organizations, the Arab League showed an inability to lead or resolve differences. The failure prompted smaller countries, who usually benefit from world order and international bodies, to work for the creation of smaller regional ones.
Hence in 1981, and under pressure from revolutionary Iran, Kuwait initiated the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), bringing together six of the seven Arab states that border the Persian Gulf.
Iraq was deemed not to be a Gulf state, on the grounds that the country shared only a tiny sliver of gulf shore.
But geography was not the only reason to keep Iraq out. Baghdad was engaged in a bitter war with Iran, and Gulf countries probably feared that inviting Iraq would invite Iranian wrath.
Since 1981, the GCC has worked in a relatively smooth manner, especially when compared to the dysfunctional Arab League.
Saudi Arabia, the biggest and most populous of the Gulf states, dominated the council, whose annual meetings are held, by rotation, in one of the member states.
Oman, the closest to Iran in the Gulf, often checked Saudi dominance and hindered attempts at further unity within the GCC, the most recent of which was in Kuwait in 2013, when Saudi Arabia lobbied for the creation of a joint military command, to be headquartered in Riyadh, along with full market integration and a common currency.
Fearing Saudi hegemony, and perhaps with Iranian instigation, Oman torpedoed the plan for a joint military command. The GCC thus maintained its status as a council of neighboring countries.
But Iran wished to further weaken the GCC, first and foremost its archrival Saudi Arabia.
To that effect, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif penned several articles in Western newspapers in which he called for the establishment of a “Greater Persian Gulf” organization, with Iran and Yemen being members of the new regional configuration.
Iran’s ability to check Saudi power within the GCC forced Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. to try to use the council for other purposes.
Since the mid-1990s, Riyadh and Qatar had been locked in a bitter rivalry. The Saudis did not support Qatari succession of power, a position that ensured the continuity of antagonism between the two sides.
As rivalry grew between them, Qatar inched closer toward the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that the Saudis have been fighting since the 1920s and that Riyadh perceives of as an existential threat to the very foundation of its system, based on tribal allegiance rather than the “consultation” that the Islamists call for.
rivalry came to a head in 2014 when Saudi Arabia, the and Bahrain severed ties with Qatar, accusing it of supporting Islamist groups, which the three Gulf allies call “terrorist” groups.
Saudi Arabia and its allies, on one hand, and Qatar, on the other, were clearly in disagreement over the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
Kuwait, the founder of GCC, sprang into action. Through shuttle diplomacy, the Kuwaitis managed to bridge the gap and bring the GCC back together.
But other than sharing cultural heritage, GCC members had little to agree on. Decision-making in the council was by consensus, rather than by voting, which further complicated conflict resolution.
The 2014 reconciliation gave the GCC a new lease on life, though a short one. By summer 2017, it was clear that the policies of Qatar and Saudi Arabia could not be reconciled. Abu Dhabi, too, was now locked in a race with Doha over regional and international influence.
Kuwait, serving as the glue that kept the council together, sprang to action again to bridge the gap and reconcile Qatar with its detractors.
This time reconciliation proved much harder. Not only Qatar was unwilling to go back to the eve before the crisis broke out, this time Qataris demanded that differences between Gulf states should be resolved either bilaterally, or within the GCC.
Doha argued that if every time there are problems it has to hear about its rivals imposing their boycott from the news, rather than through diplomatic or GCC channels, then there was no reason why the GCC should live on.
Despite the hardships, Kuwait has persisted with its mediation. Without the GCC, the region will be fragmented into alliances and sunk into more bitter rivalries.
Kuwaiti officials have said that they will continue with their attempts to rescue the because there is no alternative to the council. Should the contending parties refuse to reconcile, the GCC might simply die.
In 2000, the election of George W. Bush marked the early beginnings of a sustained American attack against the UN. Since then, Congress has often defunded whatever UN organizations that have recognized the State of Palestine.
The rise of Donald Trump saw stronger attacks on international and regional organizations, with NATO being the favorite target of Trump’s misinformed criticism. In Britain, a majority voted to break away from the EU.
As post-WWII order breaks apart and comes under attack, and as international organizations prove inadequate in performing their basic tasks, such as stopping massacres in Syria, there is no reason to believe that the GCC can survive while similar configurations become too weak and irrelevant or break up and dissolve.
It remains to be seen whether the Kuwaitis can pull one more rabbit out of their hat and keep the GCC together, at least to give the impression that the council, which never realized its goal of Gulf unity, can still function as an annual get-together for Gulf leaders.
