- Aleppo operation has shifted both psychological and military superiority to the Syrian side regarding the implementation of the March 10 Agreement. Consequently, the YPG/SDF is likely to adopt a more defensive posture at the negotiating table.
The author is Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) Levant Studies Coordinator.
ISTANBUL
The Syrian army’s limited military operation against the terrorist organization YPG/SDF in the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods of Aleppo marks a critical turning point in redefining the balance of power in post-revolution Syria. Controlled by the YPG/SDF under an agreement with the toppled Assad regime throughout the civil war, these two neighborhoods held significant symbolic weight, both militarily and politically. While they served as a bargaining chip for the YPG/SDF in integration negotiations with Damascus, the Syrian government viewed them as anomalous zones where full sovereignty had to be restored in the post-revolution era.
What transpired in Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh?
Following the overthrow of the Ba'ath regime on Dec. 8, 2024, Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh were addressed as specific agenda items during engagements between Damascus and the YPG/SDF. The agreement signed on Apr. 1, 2024, envisioned the gradual transfer of these neighborhoods to the central authority. The accord mandated the removal of heavy weaponry from the area, the termination of the YPG/SDF’s military presence, the provision of security by Syrian government forces alongside the organization’s internal security units, and the integration of administrative structures into the central government.
However, in the subsequent period, Damascus contended that the agreement's provisions were not fully or timely implemented, arguing that the YPG/SDF effectively maintained its armed presence in the neighborhoods and utilized these areas as a tool of political pressure. The friction in negotiations regarding the March 10 Agreement—which envisioned the YPG/SDF's integration within the first year of the post-revolution era—manifested as escalating tension in these two districts.
Although the parties experienced periodic friction and isolated security incidents, direct conflict was avoided for an extended period. However, a shift to a new phase was observed as the deadline for implementing the March 10 Agreement expired at the end of 2025. The parties held a final meeting in Damascus just days prior to the operation, but the YPG/SDF refused to back down from its maximalist demands. Consequently, the operation in Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh that followed immediately can be interpreted as "an attempt to break the political deadlock by establishing a new balance of power on the ground."
Tensions in Aleppo escalated on Jan. 6, 2026. Attacks launched from Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh against other districts of the city were deemed by Damascus as a clear violation of the agreement and a direct threat to urban security. While the initial days were marked by exchanges of artillery and mortar fire, control of the neighborhoods began to gradually shift to the Syrian government by Jan. 8. A ceasefire announced on Jan. 9 was swiftly violated by the YPG/SDF, prompting the Damascus administration to declare the area a closed military zone and initiate search-and-clear operations. On Jan. 10, the withdrawal of the final YPG/SDF elements from Aleppo was confirmed, and the limited operation concluded shortly thereafter with the Syrian government securing full control over Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh.
Results of the operation
The repercussions of the Aleppo operation extend far beyond the immediate military balance on the ground. The most immediate outcome of the conflict was the exposure of the fragility inherent in the YPG/SDF’s alliances with Arab tribes. Indeed, Arab tribes that had previously aligned with the YPG/SDF in these neighborhoods switched allegiance to the Syrian government as soon as the operation began. This development sets a precedent suggesting that the organization's similar alliances east of the Euphrates are equally tenuous, and that Arab elements could rapidly defect during any potential Syrian army operation in those regions. Furthermore, the Aleppo operation has shifted both psychological and military superiority to the Syrian side regarding the implementation of the March 10 Agreement. Consequently, the YPG/SDF is likely to adopt a more defensive posture at the negotiating table moving forward. In this context, military pressure may serve to redefine the balance of power in Damascus's favor and unlock the political stalemate, rather than disrupting the integration process.
The clashes also exposed the YPG/SDF's limited capacity and motivation to conduct prolonged, high-intensity urban warfare. The failure to deploy reinforcements to Aleppo stands as a significant indicator that the organization may be realigning its defense priorities toward its core territories. This provides insight into potential scenarios for future operations by Damascus in provinces like Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. Moreover, the fact that certain sub-units continued fighting despite the ceasefire, highlighted command-and-control failures within the YPG/SDF, laying bare the rift between Qandil-based elements and local components.
Another critical aspect of the operation is that the governance model Damascus adopts in Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh will directly shape how the population in eastern Syria, currently under YPG/SDF control, perceives the central government. While the restrained approach toward civilians suggests this test has begun positively, the continuation of the process remains to be closely watched. Furthermore, the ousting of the YPG/SDF from these neighborhoods eliminates a major security barrier to economic engagement between Aleppo and Türkiye, creating a new foundation for regional economic integration.
The US approach in Syria post-Aleppo
The US approach to the operation reflected a balanced posture. While Washington called upon the parties to cease hostilities and engage in dialogue, it did not project direct deterrence on the ground in favor of the YPG/SDF. This de facto strengthened Damascus's leverage, indirectly contributing to the reshaping of the status quo in Aleppo to the Syrian government's advantage. However, it remains uncertain whether this approach will persist east of the Euphrates. Notably, US rhetoric has prominently emphasized a return to the negotiating table.
In light of these outcomes, it is unlikely that a new conflict dynamic between Syrian government forces and the terrorist organization YPG/SDF will emerge in the short term. The negotiating table will likely be re-established based on this newly formed equilibrium. However, depending on potential setbacks in integration talks, this respite may prove short-lived. The Syrian government expects that the new balance on the ground will compel the organization to adopt a rational line in political negotiations. Such a development could pave the way for a political solution. Conversely, should the opposite occur, there is a risk that tensions will re-escalate and conflict will shift toward the east of the Euphrates
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.