By Umit Naci Yorulmaz
World history is full of examples where military-technological breakthroughs dismantled existing political orders and ushered in new eras. Just as the shahi cannons, cast through the military genius of Mehmed the Conqueror, tore down the insurmountable feudal walls of the Middle Ages to construct the geopolitics of the Early Modern Age, the Manhattan Project – which brought World War II to a close – propelled humanity via the atomic bomb into a modern global plane governed by a bipolar nuclear balance of terror, fundamentally reshaping the global security architecture of warfare ecosystems.
One of the most significant examples of that modern and industrial process, in which technology reconstructed the international system in such a radical manner, occurred at the end of the 19th century. In this context, the end of the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War with Prussia's absolute victory represents a major turning point that structurally reshaped the global system. The superiority that Krupp cannons provided over the French army's muzzle-loading bronze cannons – in terms of range, accuracy, and firepower – was one of the decisive elements of the war.
At the Battle of Sedan, Krupp's breech-loading forged steel cannons made visible the transformative impact of modern industrial capacity on military doctrine and political architecture. It is precisely this military and industrial rupture that raised the curtain on the period I term the "Classical Kruppist Era."
Originating from the deployment of Krupp technology in the Franco-Prussian War, the term "Kruppism" was first used by the French author George Sand – who experienced the war and its devastation firsthand – as a philosophical critique of militaristic industrialization. This conceptualization was later expanded by H. G. Wells to describe how the German arms industry, driven by capitalist profit motives, possessed a structural character that dragged the entire global system toward war.
Today, Kruppism must be treated not merely as a historical artifact, but as an analytical framework that explains how modern states generate power, establish influence, and build foreign policy capacity through the defense industry. Just as Taylorism, Fordism, and Toyotism serve as functional concepts for understanding the history of production, Kruppism serves a similar function. It illuminates how globally active defense corporations transform into structural foreign policy instruments in total integration with the reason of state (raison d'état), act as levers for constructing alliance networks, and produce an asymmetry of dependence that shapes sovereign relations.
This is because Kruppism does not view the defense industry as merely weapon systems manufactured in factories. Instead, it holistically examines the diplomatic relations, supply dependencies, training and maintenance networks, technology transfers, and the long-term strategic bonds forged with the buyer state behind these systems.
In this sense, the concept is qualitatively distinct from the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) theory formulated by Dwight D. Eisenhower in his famous 1961 farewell address. While Eisenhower's model focuses on the internal threat that the defense industry poses to domestic politics, budgets, and democratic institutions, Kruppism reveals how this structure operates as a mechanism for generating external influence and structural dependence in foreign policy.
During the "Classical Kruppist Era" of 1871-1918, weapons manufacturers like Krupp and Mauser, global commercial networks established by financial actors funding them (such as Ludwig Lowe and Gerson Bleichroder), and military advisers like Colmar von der Goltz and Emil Körner became vital instruments of Berlin’s Weltmacht (global power) vision. Operating almost flawlessly in the Ottoman Empire and Latin American markets, the Kruppist foreign policy model demonstrated that the arms trade was not merely a source of economic gain, but a tool capable of generating diplomatic influence and strategic alignment. Although the German Empire and the Hohenzollern dynasty fell from political power in 1918, the Krupp family and their enterprise endured.
The Versailles order failed to bring an end to Kruppism. Instead, it drove it into a more indirect, flexible, and clandestine form. Stripped of its military, Berlin transferred its military-technological expertise beyond its borders through defense industry actors, chief among them Krupp. Secret collaborations – such as with Bofors in Sweden, Siderius in the Netherlands, and at the Lipetsk and Kama bases in Soviet Russia – enabled the preservation of German research and development (R&D) capacity via front companies, technical partnerships, and covert networks.
Consequently, drawing from the concept of Totaler Krieg (Total War), the period between 1918 and 1945 can be defined as the "Era of Total Kruppism." During this era, the defense industry ceased to be a mere supporting element of diplomacy; instead, it moved to the very center of a massive war economy that melted down the economic, scientific, and societal capacities of states into its own crucible. With the rise of totalitarian regimes in the 1930s, this legacy assumed a more ideological, aggressive, and all-encompassing character. In this context, the defense industry transformed into one of the primary pillars of the total war state.
Following the Second World War, Kruppism evolved once again, this time into a bipolar "Bloc Kruppism." During the Cold War, every element of a nation's military hardware – from the rifle a soldier carried to the radar frequency of its aircraft – forged a systemic Waffenbrüderschaft (brotherhood-in-arms). Utilizing the same weapon systems meant that, in times of crisis, a state was inextricably bound to the manufacturing hub through dependency on its ammunition, spare parts, maintenance, and training pipelines.
Indeed, while Washington deepened this dependency relationship through standardization mechanisms within NATO, Moscow constructed a rigid logistical hierarchy inside the Warsaw Pact. Today, however, this model has given way to the "Neo-Kruppist Era," where power is defined less by caliber size and more by artificial intelligence algorithms, autonomous systems, electronic warfare, data links, and source codes.
In a multipolar world, the defense industry is an organic component of geo-economic competition. R&D, finance, diplomacy, raw material security, and supply chain management now form the main backbone of war-preparedness capacity. The vulnerability of actors who fail to develop an independent military rationality and remain dependent on external security umbrellas – despite their massive defense budgets – demonstrates the sheer inadequacy of analyses focused solely on arms procurement.
At this juncture, the synchronization between the defense industry and foreign policy becomes a decisive factor. Due to high R&D costs and economies of scale, the defense industry is structurally dependent on exports. Consequently, a country's ability to maintain a permanent presence for its defense products in global markets cannot be explained by engineering success alone. The export of military platforms requires maintenance, training, ammunition, financing, political trust, and diplomatic continuity. In other words, the sustainable success of a defense industry is directly linked to the geopolitical sphere of influence maintained by its foreign policy.
Moltke's battlefield principle of "Getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen" – meaning "March divided, strike united" – provides a powerful model for understanding this relationship. The defense industry must advance according to its own engineering rationality, while diplomacy must navigate its own political and legal dynamics. However, at the critical juncture, these two domains must converge on the same strategic objective. Technical success may win a temporary battle, but a lasting geopolitical impact is born only when diplomacy reinforces that technical success with political protection, lifecycle management, and institutional doctrinal alignment.
Military history is full of examples of states and systems that suffered tragic collapses due to the lack of a holistic macro-strategy, despite possessing immense technological asymmetries and achieving localized or short-term successes. For a defense product to secure a permanent place in the global market and carve out a geopolitical sphere of influence – in other words, to ensure that a country wins the battle without losing the broader war – it ultimately hinges on this capacity for synchronization.
One of the most vital parameters of this geopolitical synchronization is the security of access to critical raw materials. Even if a nation possesses the highest level of engineering and design capabilities, the crises triggered by a potential rupture in the supply chain yield strategic vulnerabilities that are nearly impossible to substitute or remedy. Consequently, these asymmetric risks can only be managed through the simultaneous deployment of a proactive diplomatic network and multilateral trade diplomacy instruments.
Indeed, in today's "Neo-Kruppist Era," rare earth elements form the invisible hardware backbone of every critical military architecture, from the guidance systems of smart munitions to the engine blocks of unmanned platforms. Just as the rich coal and iron basins of the Alsace-Lorraine region defined European geopolitics – and particularly Germany – during the "Classical Kruppist Era," China's near-90% dominance today in critical nodes of the rare earth elements supply chain, specifically separation, refining, and permanent magnet production, generates a similar strategic veto power in global markets.
At this juncture, raw material wars are being waged – at least for now – not through physical border crossings or conventional territorial annexation, but through refined geo-economic instruments such as the paralyzing of supply lines, export quotas, and smart embargoes.
Within this transformation matrix, the defense industry ecosystem developed by Türkiye in recent years is particularly noteworthy. The manned and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV/UCAV) systems of BAYKAR, the command-and-control and software solutions of HAVELSAN, the electronic warfare, radar, and communication capabilities of ASELSAN, the missile and ammunition family of ROKETSAN, the aerospace platforms of TUSAŞ, the naval platforms of STM, and the engine and subsystem projects of TEI and Kale Group have collectively elevated Türkiye from being a mere arms importer to a country capable of exporting security architecture.
The strategic value of this ecosystem lies not in the success of standalone platforms, but rather in its capacity to foster long-term security partnerships in recipient countries by offering a comprehensive package that includes training, maintenance, ammunition, data links, software, electronic warfare, and diplomatic engagement. In this regard, Türkiye's defense industry breakthrough stands as a prominent example in the "Neo-Kruppist Era," poised to generate a lasting geopolitical impact precisely to the extent that its technical capability operates in tandem with its foreign policy vision.
In conclusion, the defense industry extends far beyond a conventional manufacturing sector operating solely on economic rationality and commercial profit motives. By its very nature, the defense industry is inextricably linked to the domain of sovereignty, it serves as the primary pillar of a geopolitical architecture capable of enabling states to establish asymmetric dependency relations in the global system and generate international strategic influence.
However, for this capacity to transform into lasting geopolitical value, a delicate balance must be struck among industrial rationality, diplomatic flexibility, raw material security, and military necessity. Otherwise, even the most advanced platforms will yield only fleeting successes. A permanent impact is born only where the defense industry and foreign policy "march divided, but strike united."
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.
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